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ABSTRACT 
“EUROPE” IN TURKISH PARLIAMENTARY DISCOURSES: AN EXAMINATION 
OF THE VIEWS AND PREFERENCES OF MAIN TURKISH POLITICAL PARTIES 
ON EUROPE BETWEEN JUNE 2013 AND JUNE 2015 
EMİRHAN ÖZKAN 
Political Science, M.A. Thesis, July 2018 
Thesis Supervisor: Prof. Meltem Müftüler-Baç 
Keywords: discourse analysis, Europeanization, liberal theory of IR, Turkey-EU 
relations, Turkish Grand National Assembly 
Turkey-EU relations have been covered in many different aspects, but a detailed 
examination of the views and preferences of Turkish domestic political parties on Europe 
stands as a gap in the literature, especially for the period after 2013. This thesis analyzes 
and describes the political views and preferences of main Turkish political parties on 
Europe for the period June 2013-June 2015 with reference to the liberal theory of 
international relations. The deliberations in the Turkish Parliament is chosen as the data 
sources for the views and preferences of different political groups. The commonalities 
and the differences between the stances are clarified and discussed in detail with a six-
fold classification along with their positive and negative orientations. The articulation of 
Turkish views and preferences and the interpretation of the data yields significant results 
which contribute to the discussion on the Turkey-EU relations and the relevance of 
European institutions and values in Turkey. 
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ÖZET 
TÜRK PARLEMENTERLERİN SÖYLEMLERİNDE “AVRUPA”: TÜRK SİYASİ 
PARTİLERİNİN HAZİRAN 2013 TEMMUZ 2015 ARASINDA AVRUPA 
HAKKINDAKI GÖRÜŞ VE TERCİHLERİ ÜZERİNE BİR İNCELEME 
EMİRHAN ÖZKAN 
Siyaset Bilimi, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Temmuz 2018 
Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Meltem Müftüler-Baç 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupalılaşma, uluslararası ilişkilerin liberal teorisi, söylem 
analizi, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, Türkiye-AB ilişkileri 
Türkiye-AB ilişkileri birçok açıdan incelenmesine karşın, Türk siyasal partilerinin 
özellikle 2013 yılı sonrası dönemde Avrupa hakkındaki görüş ve tercihlerinin detaylı bir 
incelemesi literatürde boşluk olarak durmaktadır. Bu tez, ana Türk siyasal partilerin 
Haziran 2013 ile Haziran 2015 arasında Avrupa hakkındaki görüş ve terichlerini 
uluslarası ilişkilerin liberal teorisine referansla analiz ve tasvir etmektedir. Siyasal 
partilerin görüş ve tercihlerine dair bilgi Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi tutanakları 
incelenerek elde edilmiştir. Siyasal partilerin duruşları arasındaki benzerlik ve farklılıklar 
betimlenmiş ve altı aşamalı bir sınıflandırmaya ve olumlu ile olumsuz yönelimlerine göre 
detaylıca tartılışmıştır. Türk siyasal partilerinin görüş ve tercihlerinin tasviri ve 
yorumlanması Türkiye-AB ilişkileri ile Avrupa kurum ve değerlerinin Türkiye’deki 
önemi hakkındaki tartışmalara önemli bir katkı sunmaktadır. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND ARGUMENTATION 
1.1. The Research Question and the Relevance of the Study 
Turkey-EU relations have traditionally had a varied, unstable nature. Turkey’s 
relations with the EU never followed a steady course; instead, they witnessed many 
periods in which these relations have improved, and the hopes for further integration or 
the prospects of accession to the EU have flourished, and also the contentious times where 
both parties questioned each other’s willingness for partnership. The period from June 
2013 to June 2015 is special since this period witnessed both the deterioration of Turkey’s 
relations with the EU due to the controversial practices in Turkey such as the 
disproportionate use of police force in Gezi Events or the erosion of judicial independence 
and the freedom of expression (Özbudun 2014), and the significant developments in 
Turkey-EU relations such as the Readmission Agreement (Aka and Özkural 2015). 
 On June 2013, non-violent protesters in Turkey, composed mostly by educated, non-
political, middle-class young people, opposed the cutting of trees in Gezi Park with the 
intention of building a shopping mall there (Bilgiç and Kafkaslı 2013). The response of 
law enforcement officers was disproportionately excessive, leading to the ascension of 
the tension and the evolution of peaceful protests to violent clashes (Hürriyet Daily News 
2013). The European Union did not stay silent to these developments, which occur in a 
country negotiating for full accession to the bloc. European Parliament adopted a 
resolution criticizing the excessive use of force and the violation of the right to assembly, 
the practices incompatible with a pluralist democratic society (European Parliament 
2013). European Commission criticized the disproportionate use of force and the 
detentions of the protestors with allegations of membership to a terrorist organization in 
2013 Progress Report (European Commission 2013b). Moreover, according to 
Saatçioğlu, the government’s treatment in the Gezi Events marked a normative break 
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from the EU’s liberal values and also encouraged the EU to re-evaluate its ties with 
Turkey regarding normative and democratic principles (Saatçioğlu 2015). While the 
tension between Turkey and the EU arising from Gezi Events did not abate, another crisis 
erupted in December 2013, when a corruption case is opened against the AKP 
government. Since the government framed the investigation as a judicial coup, it 
prioritized the change of the structure of the judiciary over the investigation of the alleged 
corruption. As a result, the ruling AKP passed a series of laws aiming to change the 
structure of the judiciary, specifically the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors 
(HSYK). The new laws resulted in a significant increase in the influence of the executive 
branch over the judicial body and a critical reversal for the independence of the judiciary 
since the government became a crucial player in the appointment of the judicial officers 
and even the proceedings of the investigations conducted by public prosecutors 
(Müftüler-Baç 2016). European Commission responded with criticisms and expressed its 
“serious concerns as regards judicial independence and impartiality, separation of powers 
and the rule of law (European Commission 2014). The government’s acts towards 
revising the independence of the judiciary did not stop there. In December 2014, the 
structure of the Court of Cassation and the Council of the State had also been changed, 
further enabling the interference of the executive branch on the judicial body. Then, the 
government proceeded in its crackdown by changing the Code of Criminal Procedure and 
increased the authority of law enforcement agents critically, by changing the legal basis 
for police searches from concrete evidence to reasonable doubt and giving them the right 
for the confiscation of the properties and eavesdropping (Saatçioğlu 2016). 2015 Progress 
Report on Turkey noted the effects of this change and argued that the judges and 
prosecutors are under strong political pressure. Also, in the same report, to define the 
freedoms of expression and assembly, the Commission used the term “significant 
backsliding.” (European Commission 2015). As all of these developments are 
incompatible with the 23rd chapter of EU acquis, on Judiciary and Fundamental Rights, 
Saatçioğlu defines this process as part of “de-Europeanization,” the departure from 
European values and norms (2016). 
In contrast to this contentious picture, during this period, the ministers, and the MPs 
repeatedly declared the Turkish accession to the EU as a strategic goal and expressed their 
support. In December 2013, Egemen Bağış, then the minister of the European Union, 
declared the full support of AKP for the EU accession talks (TBMM 2013f, December 
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13). On December 2014, Volkan Bozkır, then the minister of the EU, defined the full 
accession to the EU as a strategic aim several times, which is also repeated by AKP MP 
Galip Ensarioğlu. In total, both MPs used the word “Europe” forty-six times (TBMM 
2014f, December 13). Their support for the accession was not merely limited to verbal 
declarations. MPs in Turkish Parliament stressed the importance of the compatibility of 
Turkish law and regulations to the EU acquis several times, during this period. For 
instance, Mehmet Erdoğan, an MP from AKP, defended the change in the e-commerce 
law with reference to the necessity to be compatible with the EU acquis. As part of the 
same discussion, Mehmet Ali Susam, from CHP, reiterated the same necessity, but give 
credit for the change to the acquis by claiming it is owed to the EU regulations (TBMM 
2014h, October 23). In another discussion, CHP representative Aykan Erdemir criticizes 
the existing Protection of Personal Data Law due to its incompatibility to the EU acquis 
(TBMM 2015b, January 14). Furthermore, the times that Turkey is criticized over its 
backslide into authoritarianism coincides with the period Turkey and the European Union 
have established significant cooperation on the migrant crisis: The Readmission 
Agreement. The European Union and Turkey signed the agreement on 16 December 
2013, which entered into force on 1 October 2014. The agreement sets an arrangement in 
which Turkey will accept the third-party nationals entered to the EU illegally via Turkey 
and the EU will provide support for the financial needs of the refugees, the border security 
of Turkey and recognize the right of visa-free travel to Turkish citizens. This agreement 
marks a significant development and has the potential to ameliorate the relations between 
Turkey and the EU (Kirişçi 2014). In addition, 2013 is also the year the EU has opened 
another chapter, 22nd Chapter on Regional Policy and Coordination of Structural 
Instruments, for the negotiation after a prolonged stalemate in the accession talks 
(European Commission 2013a). To sum up, despite the deterioration of Turkey-EU 
relations due to the controversial practices in Turkey, there were improvements or the 
positive signals favoring improvements in some other policy areas including economy, 
foreign policy, and even accession talks. How can we explain these two seemingly 
contrasting observed trends? This thesis built over the assumptions of liberal theory of 
international relations, articulated by Andrew Moravcsik (1992, 1997) and seeks the 
answer to this issue with an empirical analysis of the views and preferences of the leading 
domestic actors in Turkey during the period between June 2013 and June 2015. By doing 
so, the thesis aims to contribute to the understanding of Turkey-EU relations for this 
particular period. 
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The thesis does not contribute only to the literature on Turkey-EU relations. The 
findings of the study are also relevant for the literature on the Europeanization or de-
Europeanization in Turkish politics. As a candidate country to the EU, the impact of the 
negotiation process on Turkish politics attracted a significant degree of academic interest. 
The term Europeanization denotes “the emergence and the development at the European 
level of distinct structures of governance, that is, of political, legal, and social institutions 
associated with political problem-solving that formalizes the interactions among the 
actors, and of policy networks specializing in the creation of authoritative rules.” 
(Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse 2001). In other words, Europeanization implies a process 
of institution-building at the European level and assumes its impact upon the member 
states (Börzel and Risse 2000). However, an alternative approach criticized this outlook 
by defining it as a top-down model and presented an alternative bottom-up model, 
reversing the causal link of the former and prioritizing the agenda of the domestic actors 
on the transfer of European rules and institutions to the domestic setting (Alpan and Diez 
2014). According to Bölükbaşı, Ertugal, and Özçürümez, in the literature on the 
Europeanization in Turkish politics, the top-down model is dominant (2010). As a 
response to this dominance and in parallel with the overall development of 
Europeanization literature, certain studies stressed the necessity to examine the domestic 
choice for change in Turkish politics (Yılmaz 2012) and even go beyond the top-down 
and the bottom-up research designs (Alpan and Diez 2014). Moreover, as Turkish 
democracy deteriorates especially after 2013, the very idea of Europeanization became a 
point of doubt. Aydın-Düzgit and Kaliber (2016) described these developments in Turkey 
with the term de-Europeanization and defined it as “the loss or weakening of the 
EU/Europe as a normative/political context and as a reference point in a domestic setting 
and national public debates.” As noted above, the relevance of Europe is not 
straightforward though. The domestic actors in Turkey violate some European norms and 
institutions in specific areas like democratization whereas the same actors may defend the 
transfer of the European rules in other areas like economy. Besides, the different actors 
may stress different aspects of the same area; thus, the inclusion of the opposition parties 
in the analysis of the thesis is important. In this respect, the thesis is also helpful to 
articulate the relevance of European norms and institutions in Turkish domestic context; 
thus, the thesis contributes the literature on Europeanization in Turkey as well.  
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While the assumptions of the thesis are closer to what Yılmaz (2012) calls domestic 
choice for change, presuming the independence of the domestic actors and recognizing 
that the actors may use the EU norms and institutions selectively, the empirical findings 
of thesis contributes to all approaches in Europeanization to some extent, by providing 
the relevance of European norms and institutions for Turkish domestic actors. In other 
words, this thesis is an answer to the need in the existing literature with a more detailed, 
actor-oriented analysis (Thatcher 2006). The broader examination of domestic 
preferences, especially in particular issue areas like democratization, judicial reform, or 
minority right became subject to the studies (see Aydın-Düzgit and Çarkoğlu 2009; 
Müftüler-Baç 2016; Yılmaz 2012 among others); however, the detailed description of 
Turkish views and preferences for the period between June 2013 and June 2015 is still 
absent in the literature. Though the research is contributive regarding empirical results, it 
follows a theoretical tradition, and it is built on the assumptions of liberal theory of 
international relations (Moravcsik 1997). 
In this framework, the thesis seeks to answer the following question: what are the 
views and preferences of principal political parties in Turkey regarding Europe for the 
period between June 2013 and June 2015? To articulate how this question is raised in 
relation to the liberal theory of international relations, the chapter follows with the 
articulation of the liberal theory in reference to Andrew Moravcsik’s formulation, the 
presentation of the development of the research question step by step, and the research 
design of the study. The second chapter is dedicated to the review of Europeanization 
literature with a focus on the top-down and the bottom-up research models in both the 
literature in general and in Turkey-EU relations in particular. With the third chapter, the 
historical background of the relations between Turkey and the European Union will be 
provided in general lines in order to contextualize the empirical analysis. In other words, 
before the presentation of the data, how the relations between Turkey and the EU has 
evolved from the beginning to the post-2013 period will be summarized as a historical 
context. Then, the thesis follows with the analysis of the findings in fourth and fifth 
chapters. While the fourth chapter involves a rather general description of the main 
tendencies in the Turkish domestic setting, the fifth chapter provides a detailed analysis 
of each main political party as well as for each issue category. 
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1.2. Basic Principles of Liberal Theory of International Relations 
This thesis is founded on the main principles of liberal theory of international 
relations and, hence, the preferences of the domestic actors are the focal point. The main 
assumptions can be summarized as follows: the domestic actors are the primary actors, 
who represent themselves through political institutions and the strategic communication 
between the political institutions results in the formation of the state preferences. The 
international politics is an outcome of the interactions of the state preferences. Thus, if 
the preferences of different states are compatible, the cooperation will prevail. Otherwise, 
the conflict or a different form of exchange relations will emerge among the states. 
(Moravcsik 1992; 1997). As it is implied until now in parallel with this theory, the main 
claim of the thesis is that “Turkish domestic preferences are crucial to understanding the 
Turkey-EU relations and these preferences should not be confined to the ruling party’s 
choices; thus, a more comprehensive analysis involving the perspectives of all main 
political groups is a necessity”. The following part is an articulation of how the thesis’s 
argument is reached from the liberal assumptions in detail. 
1.3. Building an Argument with Liberal Theory of IR 
The distinction between the liberal and realist perspectives in international 
relations lies in their approach to the state. Realist view considers the domestic politics as 
a black box and takes the structure of the international system, which is the result of the 
distribution of capabilities in the world, as the primary determinant of the state behavior 
(Mearsheimer 2001; Waltz 1979). Neoclassical realist approach gives the domestic 
politics an explanatory value, yet still defines the capabilities and powers as the most 
crucial determinant of the state behavior (Schweller 2003). Liberal view, on the other 
hand, gives considerable importance to domestic politics and evaluates the state 
preferences as a result of domestic processes.1 Moreover, liberal theory of international 
relations puts the state preferences in the very center of its analysis and sees all the 
international politics as derivative of them. In sum, the liberal view reverses the realist 
                                                          
1 It is important to note here that what the thesis calls liberal view or liberal theroy specially refers to the liberal 
internationational relations theory as articulated by Andrew Moravcsik (1992; 1997). 
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view and prioritizes the variation in the ends over the variation in the capabilities 
(Moravcsik 1992; 1997). As Baldwin (2016) rightly pointed out, we cannot claim A is 
powerful over B’s actions, if we do not know what B otherwise would do. Thus, even to 
assess the influence of the EU, we should have knowledge of Turkish preferences as well. 
Moreover, the positive contribution of knowledge on B’s preferences is not limited to the 
evaluation of A’s power. According to liberal theory of international relations, the 
interaction of the state preferences causes the configuration of the international politics. 
If states’ preferences are compatible with each other; the likelihood of the cooperation 
between them increases. If their preferences are directly opposite, then the conflict is more 
probable. If the result of the preference interactions is in between full compatibility and 
direct opposition, then an exchange of concession may be an option, depending on the 
degree of interest conversion (Moravcsik 1992; 1997). Thus, the knowledge on Turkish 
preferences would be an essential contribution to assess the direction of Turkish-EU 
relations for two main reasons. First, for the analyzes prioritizing the effect of European 
Union on Turkish domestic politics, the knowledge on the domestic preferences in Turkey 
will enable to assess the influence of the EU more clearly since the power of an actor 
could only be understood with the information on the subject over which power is 
imposed. For instance, to assess the normative power of Europe, its capacity to influence 
the normative framework in an external country (Manners 2002; 2006), the views in this 
country concerning the European norms and values should be known beforehand. 
Secondly, for the studies stressing the role of the domestic actors’ preferences as the 
primary building block of international relations, the knowledge on Turkish domestic 
preferences is indispensable to understand the relations between Turkey and the European 
Union. For these studies, the follow-up research on the preferences of the domestic actors 
in the European setting is a necessity as well.  Considering all these reasons, Turkish 
preferences are in the very center of this analysis. 
The Europeanization models also give a significant role to the preferences of the 
domestic political actors to explain the effect of European norms and institutions on the 
domestic setting, which further supports the importance given to the domestic preferences 
in this thesis. For instance, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004) explain the process 
of Europeanization over the credibility of the EU and the political costs for the domestic 
actors. The higher the credibility of the EU, that is the stronger the linkage between the 
reform process and the accession outcome, the more probable the success of the 
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Europeanization process. However, the effect of the EU does not solely base on its 
credibility and influence. The domestic conditions play a vital role in the mediation of 
this influence. If the change arising from the Europeanization is very costly for a domestic 
actor, the less likely this actor will opt for the change. On the other hand, Europeanization 
may be a facilitator for the change in the redistribution of the resources in the domestic 
policy, thus may lead to the change in the cost-benefit calculations by benefiting a specific 
group whereas harming the interests of another (Börzel and Risse 2000). Apart from basic 
utility calculations with focus on specific rewards, these models also include the 
preferences of the into the equilibrium since the inclination of an actor may change the 
balance as well. For instance, a political party which has authoritative inclinations may 
find the democratization process costly (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004) and favor 
the status quo as a result. In this manner, in addition to the liberal theory of international 
relations, also the important models in the Europeanization literature support the 
importance of the preferences of the domestic actors for the relation between a member 
or a candidate country, and the EU. 
The primacy of domestic societal groups is the hallmark of liberal theory of 
international relations. In this view, different social groups seek their material or non-
material interests through a specific form of collective action. Based on the compatibility 
of their goals, they prefer to cooperate or conflict. In most cases, a particular amalgam of 
cooperation or the conflict emerges as the different groups converge in specific forms of 
the institution and then the resulting higher institutions compete (Moravcsik 1997). In 
today’s modern politics, the political parties are the most common political organization 
which function for interest aggregation. In addition, the social groups may not seek to 
realize their interest only through political parties and may prefer to establish intermediate 
solutions as well, like lobbies, interest groups, or unions. However, in the end, the 
political parties act as the highest institutional representation of interests (Almond and 
Powell 1966). That is why the thesis operationalizes the articulation of the interests of 
different political groups or movements in Turkey through the statements of leading 
political parties or its members. Though certain factors may influence the degree of 
representation like the size of the parties or competitiveness of the system, the political 
parties remain the vital institutions of the representation of the interests (Almond and 
Powell 1966). Thus, the examination of the general formation of Turkish views and 
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preferences on the EU through the political parties is a result of the assumption on the 
primacy of societal actors and the significance of political parties as interest aggregators. 
Bringing the two assumptions together, the liberal theory of international relations 
does not see the states as unitary actors unlike realists do firmly (Legro and Moravcsik 
1999). Furthermore, it does not view the states as actors at all; instead, it conceptualizes 
the state preferences as a result of the interaction of the domestic societal groups. The 
states have no autonomous quality; instead, they act merely as a representative. At this 
point, what Moravcsik call transmission belts, the representative institutions through 
which the societal groups translate their preferences into state policy, become crucial 
(Moravcsik 1997). A crucial “transmission belt” for foreign policy is obviously executive 
branch. The political parties realize their goals and preferences when they hold office, 
and the government of a state is the highest office for which they compete. Yet, focusing 
on the executive branch would result in the blindness to the domestic developments and 
the broader formation of domestic preferences. According to Putnam (1988), “a more 
adequate account of the domestic determinants of foreign policy … must stress politics: 
parties, social classes, interest groups … not simply executive officials and institutional 
arrangements.” In order not to fall into this limited scope, another crucial transmission 
belt is the subject of this thesis: the parliament. The parliaments do not merely include 
the representative of the ruling party, but also the representatives of the opposition parties. 
In this respect, the parliaments become the venues in which all the political parties having 
a meaningful representative power have a voice. For this reason, the parliament is a more 
suitable platform than the government to assess the preferences of domestic political 
groups in a given society since it rooms different groups than the ruling political party 
too. The choice of parliamentary deliberations to assess the political perceptions has 
already been established in the literature (Ilie 2010; Van Dijk 2003). In parallel, this thesis 
assumes that the deliberations in Turkish Parliament could represent the preferences of 
leading political parties in Turkey on the European Union. 
Consequently, deriving from the liberal principles, this thesis investigates the 
domestic preferences of main political parties in Turkey concerning Europe and the EU 
by analyzing the deliberations in Turkish Parliament. By doing so, reaching to evaluation 
and the summary of the views and preferences of the domestic political groups in Turkey 
on Europe and the European Union for the period between June 2013 and June 2015 is 
intended. This investigation will fill an important gap in the literature and contribute to 
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the literature on Turkey-EU relations and Europeanization in Turkey. However, it is 
important to note that this study is not the first in terms of using the Turkish 
parliamentarians’ views to comment on its relations with Europe. The prior studies, on 
the other hand, either focused on the interviews as data source (see McLaren and 
Müftüler-Baç 2003) or focused on certain issue areas in a time frame like the foreign 
policy of the European Union (see Müftüler-Baç and Süleymanoğlu-Kürüm 2015), or 
rather focused on the European Parliamentarians’ view on Turkey (see Aydın-Düzgit 
2015). Those who adapted to very similar time-based approaches to the deliberations in 
Turkish Parliament did not cover the period from 2013 onwards (Parslow 2006; Tanıyıcı 
2010).  
Before the design of the study is explained, it should be noted that the thesis does 
not argue that the domestic political preferences have the highest explanatory power in 
understanding Turkey-EU relations. Understanding this complex relation necessitates a 
broader analysis including, but not limited to, the decision-making at the EU institutions, 
the domestic preferences of European countries, the developments in the world politics, 
and the effects of the international system. Such an in-depth outlook is beyond the limits 
of this research. Nevertheless, the results of this thesis are not merely “supplement” for 
other alternative explanations as well, like realist accounts. This thesis has a theoretical 
foundation, and the arguments and evaluations are based on the explained main 
assumptions. The results of the thesis could be combined for further analysis, but this 
does not mean it holds a secondary position with regards to rivaling explanations. 
1.4. Research Design 
After the articulation of the main theoretical tenets behind the argument of this 
thesis, this part moves and articulates the operationalization of them by lying down the 
essential features of the research design. The thesis analyzes the preferences of main 
political parties through the examination of the deliberations in Turkish Parliament from 
June 2013 to June 2015, stretching a 25-months period. This examination will be a result 
of a contextual analysis of the statements, discussions, or declarations found in the 
parliamentary transcripts published by TGNA Minutes Journal (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi) 
after a keyword search of the terms “Europe,” “the European Union,” and “the EU.” 
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The main political parties in this thesis refer to any political party that has enough 
seats to create parliamentary groups in TGNA. As a result, by leading political parties 
this thesis refers to Justice and Development Party (AKP), Republican People’s Party 
(CHP), Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), and People’s Democratic Party (HDP)2 and 
excludes the views of independent MPs. Table 1 summarizes the votes and the seats of 
each political party. Considering the total percentage of votes gained by the four political 
party which is more than 95% of the total number of votes, Turkish Parliament is 
sufficiently representative, increasing the reliability of the findings. 
Table 1. Percentage of votes in 2011 elections and the number of seats allocated for 
each main political party 
Name of the Party Percentage of Votes 
in 2011 Elections 
Number of Seats in 
Parliament 
AKP – Justice and Development 
Party 
49,83 % 327 
CHP – Republican People’s Party 25,98 % 135 
MHP – Nationalist Action Party 13,01 % 53 
HDP – People’s Democratic Party3 6,57 % 35 
Other Parties 4,61 % 0 
Source: YSK (Supreme Electoral Council of Turkey) 2011 
The research covers the period from June 2013 to June 2015; therefore, the 
Turkish Parliament’s composition following the June 2015 and November 2015 elections 
are not included in the above table. This period is chosen because of the following 
reasons. First, it covers the period when Turkish slide into authoritarianism became more 
apparent (Özbudun 2014) and when the influence of the European institutions is still weak 
in Turkish domestic politics. In this period, domestic actors’ preferences became more 
important. As a symbolic starting point of this period, the analysis begins with the month 
Gezi events had happened, June 2013. Its end also marks the new elections and the 
                                                          
2 HDP is officially established in October 15, 2012, and the MPs from Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) 
transferred to this newly-established political party. However it was an incremental process, and there are times 
after June 2013 both BDP and HDP have MPs in TGNA. Since both parties represent more or less same political 
base, for simplcity HDP is referred to cover Kurdish-led socialist movement during the thesis. 
3 MPs from HDP participated in 2011 elections as independent candidates. All thrity-five indendent candidates 
entered into Turkish Parliament in 2011 were from the list Labor, Democracy, and Freedom Bloc, backed by 
BDP, which later became HDP. 
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changes in the Turkish Parliament. By keeping the limits of the research with a specific 
period of parliament, the actors’ stability is ensured since the subject of the analysis has 
evolved after the elections in June 2015 and November 2015, and the new parliament 
formation began after November 2015 elections did not end as the research of thesis is 
conducted. 
The data source chosen for the determination of the views and preferences of 
domestic actors in Turkey is the deliberations in the Turkish Parliament. The thesis aims 
to reach a detailed portrayal of the views and preferences with the examination of the 
parliamentary deliberations since the discussion in the parliament requires more arduous 
task of conveying the intended message through discussion with the competing views. 
The analysis assumes that the views of MPs represent the views of their own parties. In 
addition, to detect the relevant discussions, a keyword search for three words is 
conducted: “Europe,” “the European Union,” and “the EU.”4 Before a detailed 
examination of them to detect the views and preferences, the irrelevant texts are sorted 
out, such as the bureaucratic proceedings concerning the EU. To help the reader to 
understand the empirical findings better, it is necessary to clarify the intention behind the 
choice of the keywords in detail. 
The reason behind the choice of the words “the European Union” and “the EU” 
for the search is simple. This search yields important results in terms of the 
parliamentarians’ articulation of the EU and its institutions. Because MPs use these words 
interchangeably to refer to the EU, both terms are used to search their views on the EU 
and converged them under the same category. However, not all the results of the search 
are relevant and even meaningful; thus, the data is cleaned by removing the results 
concerning the bureaucratic titles such as the minister of the EU, and the official 
procedures like the roll-call for the EU Harmonization Commission. In addition, the 
results including the wrong attributions to the EU is removed such as the importance of 
Turkey’s membership to the Council of the European Union from the early times, which 
actually refers to the Council of Europe.  
The second chosen word reveals the broader understanding of European 
integration: Europe. The results of the search do not merely include the EU institutions 
but also includes other European institutions of which Turkey is a member such as the 
                                                          
4 During the search, I used their Turkish counterparts: Avrupa, Avrupa Birliği, AB 
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European Court of Human Rights or the Council of Europe. As Kaliber (2014) has argued, 
Europeanization should not be confined to EU-ization, and the analysis concerning the 
influence or relevance of Europe should include other European institutions as well. The 
inclusion of other European institutions does not necessarily mean to recognize the EU 
as a less influential organization. The EU remains the most effective institution 
empowering the European norms and values through reward and punishment mechanisms 
(Müftüler-Baç and Gürsoy 2010). However, having other European institutions in an 
analysis of Europeanization yields more inclusive results. The thesis also shares the same 
outlook. In this framework, the results of this category would contribute to the 
understanding of Turkish political parties’ views on Europe. Again, the results irrelevant 
for the discussion are eliminated such as the geographical attributions to the European 
continent or the statistical comparisons made by the parliamentarians such as Turkey’s 
rank in Europe in a given subject. 
To sum up, the thesis uses general keyword research to create two clusters. The 
first cluster includes the discussions on the European Union and reached through the 
keyword search of “European Union” and “EU.” The second cluster includes the 
deliberations on Europe in general. 
To analyze these clusters, each discussion is coded and categorized according to 
their content. These categories are accession, human rights and democratization, policy 
adaptation, economy, foreign policy, politics in Europe, identity, and culture. Accession 
category includes any statement having a favorable or unfavorable view towards the EU 
accession process of Turkey. Human rights and democratization category include any 
statement that refers to EU norms, regulations, and acquis to discuss the status of human 
rights and the democratization process in Turkey. It should be noted that the social rights 
such as worker rights are included in this category as well. Policy adaptation category is 
very inclusive and includes any statement that refers to the EU policies and acquis in the 
discussions of Turkish domestic law, regulations, and public policies, from health to 
education, from environment to public security. In economy category, any statement 
discussing Turkey’s economic relations with the European Union, including Customs 
Union, and the discussions on the re-structuring Turkish economy with reference to 
Europe is covered. The foreign policy category includes any discussion about Turkey’s 
relations with Europe as well as the impact of the European Union’s and European 
countries’ foreign policies on Turkish interests. The category of politics in Europe covers 
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any discussion related with the political developments in European countries, from the 
rise of right-wing nationalism to the rise of the left in individual countries, to the treatment 
towards Turks in individual European countries. In the identity category, statements about 
the European values, norms, and identity is covered. Lastly, the culture category refers to 
any cultural and scientific exchange between Turkey and European countries, and any 
reference to the cultural and scientific practices in Europe. The summary of this 
codification and its coverage can be found in the following Table 2. 
Table 2. Summary of categories employed in the research of the thesis 
Category Code Coverage 
Accession Access Turkey’s EU accession process and its compatibility 
with Turkish interests 
Economy Econ the adaptation to requirements of the European 
markets; the economic policies of the EU and the 
European countries; Turkey’s trade relations with 
European economies and the EU 
Foreign Policy Foreign Turkey’s relations with European countries and the 
EU; the foreign policy of the EU and European 
countries; the impact of their foreign policies on 
Turkish interests 
Human Rights and 
Democratization 
Democ the Council of Europe decisions; European 
Convention of Human Rights; European Court of 
Human Rights; the EU acquis; the EU decisions; the 
democratization process in Turkey; the status of 
human rights in Turkey 
Policy Adaptation Policy the adaptation to the EU acquis in the domestic laws, 
regulations, and public policies; the references to the 
policy practices in European countries and the EU 
regulations 
Politics in Europe Political the domestic political developments in European 
countries; the political practices in European 
countries 
Identity Identity European identity; European norms and values 
Culture Cult the cultural and scientific exchange between Turkey 
and Europe; the cultural and scientific practices in 
Europe 
 
In addition, the results are divided in terms of positive and negative orientations. 
Each statement which takes Europe, its norms, institutions, and EU acquis as a reference 
to be reached or emulated is coded as a positive view. On the other hand, each statement 
which criticizes Europe, its norms, policies, and EU acquis and argues for their 
incompatibility to Turkish interests is coded as negative view. It is important to note that 
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the collection of the data does not involve any interpretation towards the content of the 
discussions. The expressions of the MPs are not evaluated on the basis of their coherence 
or compatibility with the practice. It would be helpful here to exemplify positive and 
negative references in order to clarify the content of these orientations in the thesis. For 
instance, HDP MP Erol Dora criticized the proposed changes in HSYK and argues that 
the law is incompatible with both the decisions of the European Union and the Council 
of Europe (TBMM 2014b, Jan 22). This type of criticisms is counted as positive reference 
to the European institutions since the decision taken by them is referenced in order to 
defend a political position. On the other hand, for same law, AKP MP Yılmaz Tunç 
argued that it is in line with norms of the European Union (TBMM 2014a, Jan 21). Again, 
this reference is counted as positive reference too, since the MP attempted to validate its 
position by referencing to the EU. Thesis does not discuss whether the law is compatible 
with the EU’s norms or decisions; rather, it takes the words of the members of parliament 
into considerations simply by looking at whether or not they frame European institutions 
and values as a reference point to be emulated or to be rejected. For example, MHP 
representative Bülent Belen openly argues that the Customs Union with the European 
Union harms Turkish economy and Turkey should leave it, especially if the EU enters 
into a special economic arrangement with the USA, referring to Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TBMM 2013f, Dec 13). This statement is coded as a negative reference since the 
Customs Union with the EU is presented as a harmful arrangement for Turkish economic 
interests. Again, the thesis has no stance or evaluation towards the accuracy of the 
argument. 
In conclusion, in this chapter, the basic premises of liberal theory of international 
relations are presented, and the argument of the thesis is built step by step in reference to 
these premises. The main query of the thesis is reached, the domestic views and 
preferences in Turkey from June 2013 to June 2015, and its operationalization through 
the detailed analysis of the parliamentary discussions of main political parties in TGNA 
is explained. 
As a follow-up, the second chapter reviews the literature in Europeanization in 
general lines and relates the contributions of this thesis to discussions on the 
Europeanization. To contextualize the empirical findings of this research, the third 
chapter describes and summarizes the historical background. Then, the fourth chapter 
portrays the general trends in the views and preferences of Turkish political parties by 
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using the cluster and grouping according to the eight categories which have been 
described in this chapter. After the demonstrations of the general patterns, a more detailed 
examination of each political party’s views in relation to the two clusters and eight 
categories are provided in the fifth chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2 
EUROPEANIZATION AND TURKEY 
The first chapter has put the question, its relevance, and its operationalization forward. 
The analysis of the views and preferences of major political parties in Turkish Parliament 
would contribute to the literature on Turkish-EU relations as well as on Europeanization 
in Turkey. In order to clarify where this thesis stands in the literature, the second chapter 
is dedicated to the review of Europeanization literature in general, and the 
Europeanization literature in Turkey in particular. 
2.1. A Short Review of Europeanization: Top-Down vs. Bottom-Up Designs 
The research design of the thesis shares the liberal assumption that the preferences of 
the domestic actors are the primary building block of international politics (Moravcsik 
1997). The status of the views and preferences of the domestic political parties, on the 
other hand, does not always holds the very central role in the studies on Europeanization 
studies, though they become part of the explanation in one way or another. The literature 
on Europeanization mostly follows two research designs: top-down model prioritizing the 
effect of European norms and institutions, and bottom-up model highlighting the demands 
of the domestic actors. Though the assumptions of this thesis are closer to bottom-up 
model than the top-down model, the findings of the research are helpful for both 
approaches. To articulate how the thesis relates and contributes to the existing studies, 
and also differs in certain aspects, a short review of the literature on Europeanization and 
a brief discussion on some common premises would be helpful. 
The academic inquiry to the Europeanization has begun with analyses of the 
adaptation of the EU members to the acquis communautaire, and of the changes in their 
18 
 
domestic politics under the influence of the EU (see Falkner et al. 2005 and Héritier et al. 
2001 as examples). As the European Union has enlarged to Central and Eastern Europe, 
the impact of the EU in the newly acceding countries and the candidates raised new 
questions and led the enlargement of Europeanization literature as well (see Grabbe 2006 
and, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004 as examples; see Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier 2005 for a review). Later, the potential members of the EU became a subject 
of inquiry, especially West Balkans (see Elbasani 2014; Noutcheva and Aydın-Düzgit 
2012). Although the literature lacks a commonly-agreed definition of Europeanization, 
certain trends can be observed in alternative definitions, and in each approach, the 
importance of the domestic preferences varies. 
Olsen (2002) calls the variance in the definitions of the concept as the many of faces 
of Europeanization and points out to their differences. According to Olsen, what is 
changing in the definitions of Europeanization are “(i) the territorial reach of a system of 
governance, (ii) the development of institutions at the European level, (iii) the penetration 
of national systems of the governance to a European political center, (iv) the exportation 
of the political organization beyond the European territory, and (v) the degree to which 
Europe is becoming a stronger entity”. Usually, each definition is delimited for the 
purposes of an article or book chapter (Olsen 2002). The drawing of the boundaries of 
such a contested concept is beyond the scope of this thesis; moreover, the thesis does not 
choose and defend any specific definition of Europeanization either. Nonetheless, it is the 
purpose of this chapter to show the general discussions in the Europeanization literature 
and to point out how the findings of the study can be contributing to those discussions. 
A relatively more quoted definition of Europeanization defines it as “the emergence 
and the development at the European level of distinct structures of governance, that is, of 
political, legal, and social institutions associated with political problem-solving that 
formalizes interactions among the actors, and of policy networks specializing in the 
creation of authoritative rules.” (Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse 2001). This definition 
implies that the Europeanization is very broad in its scope and includes both the European, 
national and even sub-national levels. On the other hand, the primacy of the institution-
building at the European level is noteworthy as the focus of the definition is on the 
development of common rules and institutions at the European level, with the 
participation of the national and sub-national actors. Olsen (2002) argues that the best 
theoretical frame which captures the dynamics of the institution-building at the European 
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level is the purposeful choice of the actors in national and sub-national level. This choice 
may be relatively independent as the Moravcsik’s conceptualization of liberal theory of 
international relations suggests or may be a constrained choice in an institutional setting 
(Olsen 2002). In both scenarios, the choices of the domestic actors became a primary 
factor that enables the emergence of new institutions at the European level.  
Another strand of Europeanization discussions reverses the focus of the former 
approach and stresses the impact of the European institutions at the domestic level. 
According to Olsen, this is the most commonly used variant of Europeanization, which 
enabled its further sophistication (2002).  In parallel to this view, Ladrech defines 
Europeanization as “a process re-orienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree 
that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of 
national politics and policy-making (1994).” Unlike the Cowles et al.’s conceptualization 
of Europeanization, Ladrech recognizes the European institutions as the independent 
variable and the domestic politics as the dependent variable. The author recognizes “the 
continuing validity of national politics” and conceptualizes the national politics with an 
autonomous character responding to both sub-national and supranational influences 
(Ladrech 1994). In this conceptualization, the explanatory power of the domestic 
preferences declines, in comparison with Cowles et al.’s model, since the domestic actors 
act as response agents in this model, to the external and internal pressures. Nonetheless, 
having the knowledge on the preferences of the domestic actors could be helpful for the 
analyses based on this conceptualization since it will contribute to the evaluation of the 
impact of the European institutions. 
The external incentives model is a good illustration of the formulation of 
Europeanization highlighting the domestic impact of European institutions. The model 
explains the effect of European institutions by assuming the actors are the utility-
maximizers, and the EU is the provider of the external incentives. Accordingly, the EU 
reinforces the compliance to its rules and institutions by providing rewards and costs on 
the member states as well as the candidate countries. As the EU conditionality changes 
the calculations in the domestic equilibrium, the political groups seeking advantage on 
the implementation of EU rules and regulations favor change whereas the other groups 
benefit from the status quo resists. When the benefits from such changes exceed the costs 
associated with it, the state prefers to adopt the EU rules (Börzel and Risse 2000; 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004). Similar to Ladrech’s argument, the external 
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incentive model limits the autonomy of the preference formation to the external incentives 
or limitations given by the EU as well as the power equilibrium in the domestic politics. 
Nonetheless, the preferences have an explanatory value in this model, though definitely 
not as the primary factor; and thus, having the knowledge on the preferences of domestic 
actors would yield significant contributions to the studies using this model either. 
These two approaches can be considered as the two poles in the discussions in 
Europeanization. While a strand of Europeanization literature focuses on the effects of 
the already-established European institutions on the domestic politics, another alternative 
branch underlies the importance of the preferences of the domestic actors on the formation 
of European rules and institutions. However, there is a degree of variance in each 
approach. The studies following these two strands do not employ the same 
conceptualization altogether. For instance, Radaelli’s definition of Europeanization does 
not include the stress on the organizations Ladrech has; instead, it includes the identities 
and other cognitive aspects of politics. In addition, his definition excludes any reference 
to the lawmaking; yet refers explicitly to public policies. Hence, Radaelli sees 
Europeanization as “process of construction, diffusion, and institutionalization of formal 
and informal rules, procedures, policy, paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and 
shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU 
decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political 
structures, and public policies (Radaelli 2003).” The definitions of Europeanization made 
by Ladrech and Radaelli are not different regarding the position of the European 
institutions and the domestic agents in their causal link. Their difference arises in the 
scope of the concept, on what Europeanization includes.  
These two strands of Europeanization results in two different research designs: top-
down and bottom-up research designs. Top-down research models present the EU policies 
as exogenous variables and begin the chain of causality between them. Under the 
adaptational pressure, the effect of Europeanization goes through domestic mediating 
factors and results in a change in the domestic system (Börzel and Risse 2003). Though 
the explanation for the process of this change varies from rationalist explanations to 
sociological outlook, the EU preserves its hierarchical position, and the member or 
candidate countries are assumed to adopt them after a specific process. In other words, 
this view conceptualizes the domestic actors as responders to the EU pressures, rather 
than the agents having an independent set of preferences in relation to the EU. In such 
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explanations, the domestic politics came to the spotlight when a problem is observed in 
the implementation, and the preferences of actors are presented only if they are relevant 
for the discussion of the EU influence (Alpan and Diez 2014). For instance, Dimitrova 
(2012) argues for the need to analyze domestic preferences to understand the process and 
success of Europeanization, but this need concerns mostly if the political groups opt for 
the EU membership. Once they choose the European track, the EU conditionality shapes 
the process. In such top-down analyzes, domestic factors include domestic adjustment 
costs, veto players, and so forth and they recognize only a limited degree of autonomy to 
domestic actors. The assumed direct causal link from the EU to the domestic level stays 
as the main feature of such designs. 
In contrast to the top-down research design, the bottom-up approach examines the 
domestic politics as a more autonomous arena, yet this approach also fell short to treat 
the domestic actors as entirely independent. In bottom-up explanations, the examination 
begins at domestic level and then how they react the EU acquis is evaluated (Bölükbaşı, 
Ertugal, and Özçürümez 2010). In essence, the bottom-up research design is not different 
from the top-down model in the sense that both see the eventual transfer of the EU rules 
and institutions as the primary target to be reached and the domestic actors as the 
implementers of this goal. Neither of the models recognizes a full autonomy of the 
domestic actors and the possibility of non-European goals. 
Radaelli and Pasquier (2006) summarize the biases in both approaches by identifying 
two common problems observed in Europeanization literature. The first problem is 
“prejudging the impact of the EU on domestic politics and policy,” which is very close to 
what has been presented as the bias of top-down models. The second problem is the 
literature “assumes that if some domestic changes look similar to those proposed by 
Brussels, this must be an instance of Europeanization.” Again, this bias is what has been 
pointed out as the problem of bottom-up approaches. 
To erase the defined biases, it is necessary to go beyond the top-down and bottom-up 
models in Europeanization (Alpan and Diez 2014) and the research should explain the 
domestic choice for the change (Yılmaz 2012). In parallel, the domestic actors should be 
treated as independent agents who have their agendas and are not obliged to follow an 
absolute path. It does not necessarily mean that European pressure should be ignored or 
discarded in the analyses; instead, the domestic actors’ preferences and strategies should 
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have a greater significance in the studies in addition to the already established European 
effect. In this framework, the domestic political groups are formulated as the opportunity-
seeking agents. That is, the domestic groups value the signals and incentives coming from 
the European institutions in line with their interests in domestic levels (Hix and Goetz 
2000). In this view, the political parties may not adopt some European policies while they 
pursue others; and this is not a problem regarding the explanation since no pre-judgment 
exists concerning the preferences of the actors. This perspective enables to describe and 
explain a more extensive set of actions, including anti-Europe policies or mixed stances 
towards Europe in different policy areas.  
The theoretical approach of this thesis enables it to go beyond these top-down and 
bottom-up research designs. Though the liberal theory of international relations is closer 
to the bottom-up model, the empirical finding concerning the domestic views and 
preferences is contributive for both of these approaches. Nonetheless, the actor-based 
approach of the thesis is particularly useful for the analysis for Turkish case from 2013 
onwards since Turkish stance towards the EU has a mixed nature, which supports the 
improvement of the relations in some instances like the economy, whereas it violates the 
EU norms and institutions in others like democratization and human rights. The following 
two sub-chapters are dedicated to the articulation of this empirical relevance. 
2.2. Europeanization in Turkey-EU Studies 
In Turkey, Europeanization has attracted extensive academic attention only after the 
1999 Helsinki Summit, in which the European Council grants Turkey a candidate status 
(Müftüler-Baç 2003). Turkish academia has also demonstrated a similar inclination with 
overall Europeanization research trend and showed great interest in top-down research 
agenda, especially in the early phases (Bölükbaşı, Ertugal, Özçürümez 2010). That is, 
they have taken the impact of the EU as an independent variable, and then followed its 
influence in the domestic politics of Turkey. Turkish scholars adopted a somewhat 
normative or legalist approach to Europeanization of Turkish politics (Müftüler-Baç 
2003). In addition, the impact of the EU conditionality, especially Copenhagen criteria,5 
                                                          
5 Copenhagen Criteria refers to the rules to whcih the candidate countries are expected follow to be eligible for 
full membership. The articles of the criteria is specificed in the European Council meeting held in Copenhagen 
on June 1993. 
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on Turkish democratization process attracted particular attention (see Aydın and Keyman 
2004; Müftüler-Baç 2005 as examples). The studies with a more detailed examination of 
domestic politics’ change under the influence of the EU has followed. In this framework, 
the evolution of specific policy areas is examined in terms of Europeanization, from 
minority rights to social policy, from environmental policies to foreign policy (see Nas 
and Özer 2012 for a review). Similar to the bias explained in the Europeanization 
literature in general, these studies on the Europeanization of Turkish politics and policies 
also recognized a privileged position to the influence of the European Union and 
approached the domestic politics as a dependent variable.  
Some studies, on the other hand, pointed out the agendas of domestic actors as an 
essential factor to explain the democratization and Europeanization of Turkish politics. 
Öniş (2010) argues that the EU accession is used by the political parties to promote their 
agendas in domestic politics, primarily to consolidate their powers for the political center. 
Kalaycıoğlu (2011), on the other hand, makes a distinction on when the preferences of 
domestic actors became a vital factor to explain Turkey-EU relations and points the period 
after 2004 as the start line. Still, he also argues that the EU became relevant or influential 
in Turkish politics as long as the domestic agenda supports it. In addition, the importance 
of the EU vis-à-vis domestic politics showed itself in anchor vs. trigger discussions in 
Turkey-EU relations (Tocci 2005; Uğur 1999). Tocci (2005) detects certain limitations 
on the focus on the EU conditionality and concludes that the process of Europeanization 
is driven by “endogenous” factors, though she also stresses the EU-related pressures.  
In all these studies, similar to the pattern in Europeanization research in general, the 
authors either did not recognize a full autonomy of the domestic actors or do not present 
a detailed examination of domestic preferences. In order to fill this gap, the thesis 
demonstrates the preferences of domestic actors in Turkish setting with reference to the 
parliamentary discussions. This analysis will be a significant empirical contribution to the 
debate on Turkey-EU relations. Yet, the significance of this study is more than a simple 
empirical addition to the literature. This thesis also responds to the puzzle emerged in 
Turkish case after 2004, where Turkey has continued to adopt the EU acquis in some 
policy areas even though the EU conditionality has weakened. The following subchapter 
will further elaborate this point. 
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2.3. The Turkish Puzzle 
Top-down research designs and the prioritization of the influence of the EU on the 
changes in domestic politics are not criticized merely because of a bias removal. A more 
critical factor is to reach greater parsimony, to explain a broader set of behavior, 
especially in the Turkish case. A significant challenge to the analyzes assigning primacy 
to the influence of the EU arose when they were not able to explain the observed trend 
emerged after 2004 in Turkey. Since then, the EU conditionality has weakened, but 
Turkey has implemented some reforms regardless, though selectively. Since 2013, AKP’s 
drift to authoritarianism did not obstruct it or other parties to pursue some EU-related 
policies. Actor-based approaches proved to be more successful in covering these new 
trends as well as the behavior of AKP after 2004. Because the thesis assumes the 
preferences of the domestic actors has the prime role in explaining the behavior of the 
states and sees the influence of the EU in a secondary position, AKP’s seemingly 
contrasting positions does not cause a theoretical problem. The assumptions of the thesis 
explains both the AKP’s support for the implementation of the democratic reforms in 
reference to the EU norms and institutions after 2004 despite the decreased EU credibility 
and its cooperation with the EU in the migrant crisis in 2014 while it moves away from 
the democratic principles with reference to the preferences of the views and preferences 
of Turkey. In both events, the ruling party’s preferences have a more determining effect 
than the EU’s incentives, which is mostly absent. Though the analysis of the thesis is 
limited to the period from June 2013 to June 2015, the puzzle emerged after 2004 in 
Turkish case demonstrates the further relevance of the thesis and its theoretical premises; 
moreover, the examined 25-months period is a continuation of this trend emerged after 
2004. Thus, in this subchapter, this puzzle will be explained to demonstrate the further 
relevance of this thesis and its theoretical premises. 
The EU influence on the domestic politics through EU conditionality can be attributed 
to three mechanisms: the determination of the rules set as conditions for rewards, the size 
and the pace of the rewards, and the credibility of the threats and the rewards 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). Any meaningful increase in each factor results 
in the growth of the EU influence as well, or any significant decrease results in the 
weakening. During the accession process to the EU, the fundamental rules for the 
candidate countries are the Copenhagen criteria. The Copenhagen criteria specify the 
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conditions to be a member state of the European Union, which can be summarized as the 
commitment to the democracy, the rule of law, human rights, market economy, economic 
development, and the protection of the minorities (Council of the European Union 1993). 
Typically, the credible EU signals should establish a causal link between the reform 
process and the accession outcome and exclude any references to criteria other than the 
ones specified in the 1993 Copenhagen Summit. For Turkey, this causal link has blurred 
as the European Commission reports increasingly referred to additional and non-political 
criteria, resulting in the decrease of the EU conditionality on Turkey, especially after 2004 
(Saatçioğlu 2010). 
In the first few years of 2000s, the European Commission and the European Council 
stated that the membership conditions for Turkey is no different from other candidate 
countries and are solely based on the Copenhagen political criteria (European 
Commission 2002; Council of the European Union 2002; European Commission 2003). 
For instance, the Presidency Conclusion of the European Summit held in Brussels on 24 
and 25 October 2002 openly invites Turkey to “take further concrete steps in the direction 
of implementation, which will advance Turkey's accession in accordance with the same 
principles and criteria as are applied to the other candidate States (Council of the 
European Union 2002).”  The reports published by the European Commission and the 
European Council suggested Turkey could be a member of the EU once it delivers the 
necessary reforms. However, starting from 2014, the inclusion of the non-political 
criteria, in addition to the Copenhagen criteria in the reports of the European Commission 
contradicted with the previous promises. The claims of absorption capacity, the stress on 
the open-ended nature of the accession negotiations, the need for good neighborly 
relations, and the possible population pressure of Turkey in case it accedes to the 
European Union appear in the decisions of the European Council and the European 
Commission, in addition to the political criteria. Even cultural differences are presented 
as a challenge, and it is implied that the inclusion of Turkey is different from other phases 
of enlargement (Council of the European Union 2004; European Commission 2004a; 
2004b; 2004c). In addition to these extra non-political criteria added to the Turkish 
accession process, the tensions arising from the foreign relations also affected the 
accession process, which is again added another criterion, the good neighborly relations, 
which is not part of the Copenhagen criteria. Since the Republic of Cyprus has accessed 
the European Union without a meaningful solution to the Cyprus issue, it created yet 
26 
 
another significant obstacle for Turkish accession. The European Commission and the 
Council referred to this problem many times as a substantial barrier for Turkish 
membership (Council of the European Union 2006; 2008; 2010; European Commission 
2006; 2008; 2009a; 2009b; 2010). The rhetorical changes in the European Union and 
increasing reference to the non-political factors resulted in a dramatic drop in the EU’s 
credibility (Saatçioğlu 2010). Substantial policy repercussions by the European Union 
followed such rhetorical changes as the EU has suspended the negotiations in eight 
chapters due to the Cyprus issue (Council of the European Union 2006). In addition to 
the stalemate arising from the EU’s stance on the Cyprus issue, Turkish accession to the 
EU became a focal point in domestic politics at certain key European countries like 
France and Germany, and the privileged partnership, a specific form of special status, is 
suggested instead of full membership. The combination of these two developments 
caused the policymakers in Turkey to see the EU as an unreliable partner and aided in the 
rise of Euroscepticism in Turkey (Öniş 2007). Consequently, the conditionality of the EU 
has lost its influence after 2005 (Noutcheva and Aydın-Düzgit 2012; Saatçioğlu 2010). 
In parallel, anti-European sentiments in Turkey made the implementation of the EU 
demands costlier and less likely for the policymakers (Çarkoğlu and Kentmen 2011; Öniş 
2007; Patton 2007). The following slow-down in the EU reform process in Turkey was 
not surprising after these developments. 
Despite this discouragement in both domestic and international level, concerning the 
audience costs and the EU conditionality, Turkey has resumed reforms in specific policy 
areas with reference to Europe. The reforms in the judicial system, the military, and the 
minority rights can be considered in this framework (Aydın-Düzgit and Çarkoğlu 2008; 
Gürsoy 2011; Yılmaz 2012; Yılmaz and Soyaltın 2012). This puzzle, the continuation of 
the reforms despite the lack of the influence of the EU conditionality validates the stance 
of the actor-based bottom-up approaches by creating a semi-natural critical experiment. 
If the reforms continue in the absence of a presumed cause, then the attribution of a causal 
link would be misleading. A more parsimonious explanation is necessary to cover all the 
empirical findings if a critical experiment fails the rival explanation (Lave and March 
1993). Moreover, Turkey also followed an idiosyncratic path and chose specific policy 
areas to adapt while disregarding others. This trend, too, can be better explained with an 
actor-based approach as the domestic actors’ agenda highly influence the process and 
they are assumed to seek policies in their group’s interest (Hix and Goetz 2000). 
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Therefore, the examination of the domestic politics is necessary to explain Turkey-EU 
relations in a more encompassing manner with its greater parsimony of the empirical 
patterns. 
After the first chapter introduced the relevance of the study, this chapter further 
detailed where the contributions of the thesis stand in Europeanization literature as well 
as the literature on Turkish-EU relations. After the main definitions of Europeanization 
is presented and the relevant top-down and bottom-up research designs are summarized 
and evaluated, the promises of the theoretical stance of the thesis become clearer. An 
actor-based explanation, treating the domestic actors’ preferences as an independent 
variable, is necessary to understand Turkish-EU relations since the influence capacity of 
the EU on Turkey, the EU conditionality, has weakened and the relevance and the effect 
of the choices of the domestic actors increased.  The thesis does not only contribute 
empirically to the existing literature on Europeanization and Turkish-EU relations; it also 
built on a more parsimonious framework to make sense of Turkish behavior on selectively 
pursuing specific Europeanization tracks while disregarding others.  
The results of this research will not be meaningful without a historical context; thus, 
the third chapter describes and summarizes the general historical development of Turkish-
European relations, from 1945 to up until 2017. Without claiming an exhaustive summary 
of all developments in Turkish-EU relations, the following chapter is intended to 
contextualize the data which will be presented in fourth and fifth chapters. 
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CHAPTER 3 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 After the motivations and then the theoretical framework of the thesis is 
summarized in the previous chapters, the background information related with the 
Turkey-EU relations is a necessity to understand the results which will be presented in 
the following chapters. Certain phases of the relations with Europe is still subject to 
discussions domestically, such as the Customs Union Agreement with the EU. Moreover, 
the context that the deliberations are conducted in the parliament, the period starting with 
2013, is important for their evaluations and the assessment of their relevance as well. This 
chapter, however, does not aim to present an exhaustive summary of Turkish-EU 
relations; rather, the target of the chapter is to provide the general trends in the 
development of Turkish-EU relations in order to contextualize the empirical findings 
which will be presented in the fourth and fifth chapters. The weakening of the 
conditionality, and the increasing relevance of the preferences of the domestic political 
actors are the main fault lines in the chapter’s narrative. 
 The chapter analyzes the historical development of Turkish-European relations in 
four periods. The first period covers a large time interval, from 1945 to 1999. This period 
is important as it is the foundation upon which the contemporary relations has built up. It 
begins in post-WWII setting and continues until the time Turkey became more than a 
partner neighbor, that is a candidate country. The second period begins with the candidacy 
decision of Helsinki Summit for Turkey and continues until the time when EU 
conditionality began to weaken. The third period covers the times when the EU 
conditionality is weak, yet Turkey conducts certain reforms in selected areas, from 2004 
to 2013. The last period marks the years Turkey’s slide into authoritarianism became 
more apparent and its orientation to the West is questioned.  
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3.1. Old Times, 1945-1999 
 Turkey was an important member of Western bloc in post-WWII era. In February 
1945, Turkey joined to World War II in the side of Allies. In 1947, Turkey was among 
the European countries receiving Marshall aids from the US, which subsequently resulted 
in its membership to the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), 
which later became Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
as a founding member in 1948. In 1949, Turkey was one of three countries invited to 
become a founding member of the Council of Europe after its establishment treaty is 
signed in London. In 1952, Turkey has joined to North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) along with Greece. As all these developments suggest, in post-WWII years, 
Turkey had a significant place in Western bloc in terms of politics, economics, and 
security (Oran 2010a). 
 Even though Turkey eagerly participated in the other European projects, such as 
OEEC or the Council of Europe, it was rather cautious towards newly emerging European 
Economic Community (Müftüler-Baç 1997; Oran 2010b). On the other hand, Turkey was 
interested in European integration efforts because of its strategic aim to be included in 
Cold War institutional arrangements (Müftüler-Baç 1997), its desire to overcome 
economic difficulties, and its competition with Greece (Oran 2010b). In this framework, 
Turkey has applied to EEC on 31 July 1959 for an associate membership and the Ankara 
Agreement, formally Agreement establishing an Association between the European 
Economic Community and Turkey, was signed on 12 September 1963. This agreement 
established more sophisticated economic relations between Turkey and the EEC. 
Moreover, it set up a three-phased customs unions plan, and acknowledged the final goal 
of full membership in Article 28 (Council of the European Communities 1992). In 
addition to the slowness of the application of the transition phases, planned as around 
twenty-five years (Oran 2010b), the tumultuous domestic politics of Turkey did not help 
to the process either. In 1978, Turkey revoked the self-protection clause of Ankara 
Agreement and froze the Association unilaterally. After 1980 coup d’état in Turkey, the 
European Community decided to freeze its political relations with Turkey and freeze the 
Ankara Agreement. In addition, the European Parliament declared it would not renew the 
European members of the Joint Parliamentary Commission. This deadlock resumed until 
the Association Council of Turkey and the EEC meets in September 1986 (Erdemli 2003).  
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 In 1987, Turkey finally applied for full membership to the EEC, but the 
Commission stated that both Turkey and the EEC is not ready for this enlargement since 
the EEC was in the way of transformation into a single market. In addition, the tension 
between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus issue was presented as a challenge. Moreover, 
the gap between the Turkish and European economy was shown as a sign for the necessity 
of the establishment of a customs union with Turkey before its full membership 
(European Commission 1989). The agreement for a customs union was reached in 1996, 
though only for industrial products. Still, this agreement marked a closer economic and 
political relations between the EC and a non-member state. Though the nature of the 
agreement was mostly economic, the EC conditioned its finalization to certain democratic 
improvements in Turkey, such as changes in anti-terrorism law (Balkır 1998). The impact 
of European institutions would be felt more deeply in incoming years. 
 This general summary of the period from 1945 until 1999 suggests that Turkey 
has given a vital significance to the Western, European institutions in the Cold War years 
and the relations between Turkey and the EC has improved in a great extent. Nevertheless, 
the slow-pacing of the membership period had its signals even in these beginnings, which 
became clearer when Turkish experiences is compared with Greece, Spain, and Portugal 
(Öniş 2007).  
3.2. Good Times, 1999-2004 
 In 1999, the European Council met in Helsinki and made a very significant 
decision, as they recognized Turkey as a candidate country for the EU (Council of the 
European Union 1999). As Turkey become part of the enlargement process, the influence 
of the EU has increased on Turkish domestic politics (Noutcheva and Aydın-Düzgit 
2012). In this period, important steps for the democratization of Turkish politics is taken; 
yet, mostly because of political reasons, a significant political stalemate began to take 
shape in 2004 between Turkey and the European Union, due to conflicting signals from 
the EU and the Cyprus issue.  
 The European Council’s decision in its Helsinki Summit to recognize Turkey as 
“a candidate state destined to join the Union” (Council of the European Union 1999) is a 
major turning point in Turkey’s relations with the European Union. Unlike the 
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conclusions at the former summit in Luxembourg, where Turkey is the only applicant 
country not counted among the states for which accession talks will be held along with 
Eastern European countries and Cyprus (Council of the European Union 1997), in two 
years, the European Council declared Turkey’s accession will be “on the basis of the same 
criteria as applied to the other candidate states.” This emphasis on the equal treatment is 
crucial because the EU will not keep this promise and non-political criteria will be 
referred in Turkey’s accession negotiations, which will deteriorate the EU’s influence on 
Turkish domestic politics significantly (Saatçioğlu 2010).  
 Helsinki decision accelerated the reform process in Turkey in both political and 
economic areas in order to meet the requirements of Copenhagen criteria. These reforms 
cover a rather large set of policy areas from the extension of citizenship rights to 
elimination of human rights violations including the freedom of expression, the freedom 
of association, and the prevention of torture. The reforms have aimed at the creation of a 
liberal, pluralist political order and strong regulatory state on economics (Öniş 2003). In 
2001, Turkey declared the National Program for the Adaptation of the Acquis and set a 
large reform program targeting to meet the Copenhagen criteria, which was revised in 
2003. The constitutional changes and the harmonization packages, the changes in law to 
meet the acquis, followed these decisions rapidly. Öniş (2003) describes early 2000s as a 
period of profound and momentous change in Turkish history. The harmonization efforts 
that began with the coalition governments continued after the AKP came to power as well 
and continued until mid-2000s (Kubicek 2011; Müftüler-Baç 2005). As a positive 
response to these changes, the European Council declared that the negotiations with 
Turkey will begin without delay if the Council decides that Turkey fulfills the 
Copenhagen criteria in 2004 (Council of the European Union 2003).  In 2004, the 
European Commission recommended the start of the negotiations on 3 October 2005 
(Council of the European Union 2005). 
 During all these changes, the EU institutions continued their emphasis that Turkey 
will be treated equally with other candidate countries, and its accession conditions are 
only based on the Copenhagen political criteria (European Commission 2002; Council of 
the European Union 2002; European Commission 2003). Of course, this emphasis is in 
very parallel with the EU’s credibility and its influence on the domestic politics in Turkey. 
The match between the preferences of the domestic actors and the EU’s demands marks 
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a strong fit in this period (see Börzel and Risse 2000; 2003). As these signals evolved into 
a different direction in 2004, it marked the end of the ideal match.  
3.3. Times without Conditionality, 2004-2013 
 Starting in 2004, the European institutions began to add new, non-political 
references for the evaluation of Turkey’s accessions prospects to the EU. This new trend 
decreased the EU credibility in the domestic politics of Turkey. Nevertheless, certain 
reforms are made in Turkey with reference to the accession to the EU or the acquis, mostly 
due to the preferences of domestic actors. 
 The Commission reports and the European Council presidential conclusions refers 
to non-political criteria in addition to the already-agreed-upon Copenhagen criteria in 
2004 onwards. These references include the concerns for the EU’s capacity to absorb new 
members, the need for good neighborly relations, the size of Turkish population and its 
effects on the EU in case it becomes a full member, and even the challenges arising out 
of the cultural differences. In addition, the stress on the open-ended nature of the 
negotiations became yet another pattern in these documents (Council of the European 
Union 2004; European Commission 2004a; 2004b; 2004c).  
 Furthermore, the domestic developments in key members of the EU, France and 
Germany, affected the negotiation process negatively, since the newly incoming leaders 
in each country questioned the European credentials of Turkey (Öniş 2010). In addition, 
the accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the EU without any solution the impasse in the 
island led to yet another barrier for Turkish accession efforts. The European Commission 
and the European Council underlined this issue several times a significant obstacle for 
Turkish membership (Council of the European Union 2006; 2008; 2010; European 
Commission 2006; 2008; 2009a; 2009b; 2010). These tensions led to important results 
for the negotiations. In 2006, the EU has suspended the negotiations in eight chapters 
because of the impasse on the Cyprus issue (Council of the European Union 2006). The 
six additional chapters are blocked by the Republic of Cyprus itself as a protest to 
Turkey’s refusal to recognize it as the representative of the island and to open its ports 
(Tocci 2010).  
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 As a result of these developments, the EU credibility and the conditionality has 
dropped significantly in the view of Turkey (Noutcheva and Aydın-Düzgit 2012; 
Saatçioğlu 2010). Yet, despite the slowdown on the reforms (Kubicek 2011), the reforms 
in certain policy areas has resumed with reference to Europe, which could be described 
as the Turkish Puzzle. The reforms in the judicial system (Müftüler-Baç 2016), in the 
minority rights (Yılmaz 2012), in the position of the military (Gürsoy 2011), in the fight 
against the corruption (Yılmaz and Soyaltın 2012) can be counted among those policy 
areas. 
 In conclusion, the rising impact of the Europe in the former period is shaken after 
2004 and the influence of the European institutions has decreased in an important degree. 
However, though slowly, the reforms have continued in certain policy areas. This 
motivation for the change may be attributed to the domestic preferences of the actors and 
their competition, specifically between ruling party and the secular opposition 
(Kalaycıoğlu 2011; Öniş 2007; 2010). 
3.4. Hard Times, after 2013 
 The weakening of the EU conditionality on Turkey turned to be almost non-
existent phenomena in period after 2013 since the deterioration of the democracy in 
Turkey detriment its relations with the European Union as well.  
 Though the establishment of AKP hegemony in Turkey through its struggles with 
judicial and military establishment brought important democratic achievements until mid-
2010s, it turned to be a pro-status quo party after. Moreover, it undermined the democratic 
consolidation through its governance based on securitization, otherization, and 
polarization, which led to vital damages to the freedoms of expression, assembly, and 
information in Turkey (Keyman and Gümüşçü 2014). The internal political struggles 
worsened the scene, and the freedoms are restricted increasingly along with weakening 
judicial independence and the democracy. Gezi Park events in 2013 marked this 
deterioration trend as the ruling party responded the peaceful, non-political protesters 
with disproportionate police violence and deepened the polarization in the country 
(Özbudun 2014).  
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 Unsurprisingly, this deterioration has affected Turkey’s relations with the EU and 
other European institutions very negatively. In response to the Turkey’s harsh human 
right violations during the Gezi events, Germany has blocked the start of the talks between 
Turkey and the EU (Dombey et al 2013). Though the relations have seemed to be 
improving in certain issue areas such as the migration and the refugees (Crisp 2016), the 
continuous deterioration of the freedoms in Turkey did not help much for the amelioration 
of the relations. In opposite, as response to the increasingly dependent judiciary in Turkey 
and other undemocratic practices in Turkey after 15 July coup d’état attempt, the Council 
of Europe decided to put Turkey in the watchlist to monitor its falling democracy (Rankin 
2017). Moreover, the European Parliament recommended the suspension of the accession 
talks with Turkey on July 2017 (Toksabay and Karadeniz 2017). As Turkey’s relations 
with the European Union deteriorated, the orientation of Turkey towards Europe is 
questioned and alternative approaches to the Europeanization has been developed such as 
de-Europeanization (Aydın-Düzgit and Kaliber 2016). 
 The thesis analyzes the beginnings of these tumultuous times, from June 2013 to 
June 2015, and questions the relevance of the Europe and the European Union in the 
deliberation in the Turkish parliament. As explained before, the choice of the beginning 
date is based on the importance of 2013 for the deteriorating democratic standards in 
Turkey symbolized with Gezi. It ends in June 2015 because new elections were held in 
this date and the composition of the parliament has changed after. The thesis aims to 
portray the preferences of main political parties concerning Europe and the European 
Union in these volatile times. In the next chapters, the results of the research will be 
presented. 
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CHAPTER 4 
GENERAL PATTERNS OF THE DELIBERATIONS IN TURKISH 
PARLIAMENT CONCERNING EUROPE 
With this chapter, the presentation of the empirical findings will begin after its 
theoretical assumptions and argumentation are explained in the second chapter, its 
relevance is summarized in the second chapter, and its historical and contextual 
background is described in the third chapter. Considering the complexity of the empirical 
data, the presentation is divided into two. As a first step, this chapter sums up the general 
trends in the views and the preferences of Turkish political parties, without specifying the 
individual sets. In the following chapter, the preferences of the main political parties will 
be defined in detail and compared. In this framework, this chapter is dedicated to the 
demonstration of the general patterns of the views and preferences of main Turkish 
political parties on Europe as well as the European Union. 
 In this chapter, firstly, the frequency of the discussions on Europe and its volume 
is discussed. Then, Pareto distribution of the deliberation issues is evaluated according to 
the eight categories articulated in the first chapter, and to their positive and negative 
orientations. Based on these results, the articulation the main agenda topics and 
contextualization of the discussions on the relevant categories will follow. The same 
blueprint is intended to be applied to the discussions on the European Union; however, 
because the results on the EU did not demonstrate any significantly different pattern, its 
results are not discussed separately. 
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4.1. Discussions on Europe in TGNA from June 2013 to June 2015 
 The positive references to Europe in Turkish parliamentarians’ deliberations stays 
mostly dominant from June 2013 to June 2015, though along with a constant share of 
negative references. Below, in Figure 1 and 2, the solid line represents the positive views 
towards Europe whereas the dashed line represents the negative views. As Figure 1 
indicates, the change in positive views and negative views follows mostly a similar 
trajectory: they tend to increase or decrease at the same time interval. Moreover, the 
general formation of the views towards Europe at TGNA is almost always favorable, with 
a significant exception in June 2014, in which the negative views surpass the positive 
ones one and only time. Overall, the Turkish preferences are mostly positive, as 79,51% 
of all the uses of Europe in this period has a positive connotation, which also suggests a 
considerable 20,49% negativity rate. These patterns will be more meaningful when they 
are examined with the context of the deliberations; so that the analysis of the peak times 
follows in reference to the deliberation topics of the month and also the common themes 
discussed across the months. 
Figure 1. Frequency of the positive and negative references to Europe,  from June 
2013 to June 2015 
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Figure 2. Volume of the positive and negative views 
on Europe, in percentages 
On June 2013, the discussions on 
human rights and democratization 
dominated the deliberations, with 88 out of 
total 141 uses of Europe on this month 
referring to the level of democracy in 
Turkey. This is a response to Gezi events 
and the deliberations on this month revolved 
around human rights abuses and the level of 
democratization in Turkey, including the 
right to assemble, the freedom of expression, the use of disproportionate force by the law 
enforcement agents. In the following months, the volume of discussions on Europe, that 
is the use of the word Europe, declined until it began to rise on October 2013, and 
considerably increase on November 2013 and December 2013. The rise on November 
2013 owed to the spikes in the discussions on the economy and democratization, and this 
trend is not merely a response to a particular event. Instead, the discussions on the human 
rights and democratization on November 2013 were distributed on a fairly wide set of 
events including the conditions of the prisons, the detention practices, the headscarf issue, 
the right to assemble, the right to live, and the conditions of the subcontracted workers. 
The deliberations on the economy in this month, on the other hand, concentrated on the 
law of consumer rights and public procurement law. The dramatic increase in December 
2013 is thanks to the annual central budget talks for 2014, which composes the evaluation 
of every institution and under the executive branch and their budgets in order to obtain 
the approval of the parliament. Again, the discussions on the human rights and 
democratization take the leading share, 91 out of 292, yet this time the deliberation on the 
accession process has an approximately similar portion, 78 out of 292, which are followed 
by the categories economy, foreign policy, and the politics in Europe. As the trend 
declines in January 2014, February 2014 sees another spike, again in terms of 
democratization, mostly due to the new law changing the structure of High Council of 
Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK), which puts the judicial independence in jeopardy 
significantly (Özbudun 2015). In all of these debates, the EU, European institutions, and 
norms have found their place as a reference point to legitimize the stances of each political 
79,51%
20,49%
Europe+ Europe-
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party, though mostly used by the opposition parties, which will be further elaborated in 
the fifth chapter. 
In June 2014, for the first and only time during the examined period, the intensity 
of the negative views had overpassed that of positive views. This sudden and peculiar 
change in the overall trend emerged due to the discussions on the ratification of the 
Readmission Agreement between Turkey and the EU, concerning the illegal immigrants 
flocked to Europe. The agreement establishes an arrangement in which Turkey will accept 
the third-party nationals entered to the EU illegally via Turkey and the EU will provide 
support for the financial needs of the refugees, the border security of Turkey and 
recognize the right of visa-free travel to Turkish citizens (Kirişçi 2014). All of the 
opposition parties strongly rejected the agreement on the grounds of unfair treatment to 
Turkey. Faruk Loğoğlu from CHP argued that the EU treats Turkey with double-standard 
and presents the financial support and visa-free travel to Turkish citizens as if it is not 
obliged already under the treaties signed between Turkey and the EU, specifically Ankara 
Agreement (TBMM 2014e, Jun 19). Similarly, Lütfü Türkkan, an MP from MHP, 
claimed that Europe has imposed the agreement on Turkey and the EU does not treat 
Turkey as an equal partner (TBMM 2014e, Jun 19). HDP representative Erol Dora move 
forward and criticized the EU by arguing that it follow a security-oriented foreign policy 
instead of a humanitarian one (TBMM 2014e, Jun 19). Interestingly, even though the 
representatives of the ruling party described the EU as an unreliable partner and claimed 
that it does not act in line with humanitarian goals, they favored the agreement. For 
instance, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, the minister of foreign affairs, criticized the EU by claiming 
that the EU left human-oriented focus and also that the EU applies double-standard to 
Turkey on conditioning the visa to another agreement, though it is already promised in 
Ankara Agreement (TBMM 2014f, Jun 24). This month marks the only time that all main 
political parties shared the same orientation in any category; and the fact that they merged 
on an unfavorable position rather than a favorable one resulted in this negative peak. 
Though the discussions on Europe followed a low profile up until November 
2014, it reached the record high number during this period on November 2014 and then 
peaked on December 2014. The rise on November 2014 is mostly because of the foreign 
policy discussion of the EU around the authorization of Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) to 
support the EU-led operations in Africa, referring to the UN-mandated, EU-led operations 
in Mali and the Republic of Central Africa (CNN Türk 2014), and the democratization 
39 
 
discussions due to another change in the structure of High Council of Judges and 
Prosecutors (HSYK), the supreme disciplinary body regulating the judicial officials. The 
highest frequency on the use of Europe during the studied period is reached on December 
2014, again during the annual central budget talks, which roomed the discussions on the 
accession period of Turkey, the backslide of Turkish democracy, the various human rights 
violations across the country, and the need for economic cooperation with Europe 
especially for the re-structuring Turkish economy. Following this peak point, the 
frequency of the discussions decreased in the following months, with the exception of 
March 2015, where the democratization discussions again flourished as a response to the 
controversial enforcement law known as domestic security bill, which increases the 
authority of law enforcement agents dramatically and raised the concerns of significant 
human rights violations (Hürriyet Daily News 2015). 
As all the major discussion agendas Europe is referred suggests that Europe’s 
primary relevance for Turkey is human rights and democratization, and the topics like 
economy and the accession process attract significant attention as well. On the other hand, 
the preferences for the foreign relations with the EU seems as a significant challenge for 
the relations between Turkey and Europe. Nevertheless, although the analysis of general 
trends through peak points is helpful, all the discussion data should be analyzed to detect 
the most important and relevant discussion categories and the perceptions of the actors as 
well. For this reason, the Pareto chart in Figure 3 would be very helpful. 
Figure 3. Pareto chart describing the distribution of the categories in the discussion 
of Europe, from June 2013 to June 2015
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 The Figure 3 demonstrates that the biggest volume in the deliberations in Turkish 
Parliament belongs to the human rights and democratization category. The apparent 
dominance of the category suggests Europe’s first and foremost role in Turkish politics 
is being a reference point for human rights and democratization. This finding implies the 
presence of significantly positive reception for the normative power Europe in the 
domestic politics of Turkey (see Manners 2002; 2006).6 As the chart suggests, in terms 
of policy adaptation, economy, and the accession to the EU, the positive orientation is 
stronger than the negative one. Nevertheless, the negative view towards Europe in foreign 
relations stands as a significant block among positive perceptions, as the total volume of 
the negative perceptions stands in the second place among all sixteen sub-categories. 
Another significant result we can reach from the chart is that the discussions on the 
democratization, foreign policy, economy, policy adaptation, accession to the EU, and 
the politics in Europe covers almost all the discussions, and the relevance of the identity 
and culture seems almost non-existent for the deliberations in TGNA. Based on this 
finding, the perceptions on the identity and culture will not be articulated in this analysis; 
instead, the major six categories for which the main political parties refer with a higher 
interest will be on the focus. 
4.1.1. Human Rights and Democratization 
 The human rights and democratization theme is the strongest among other topics 
in the discussions on Europe at TGNA. As Figure 4 and 5 indicate, the reference to Europe 
in democratization discussions is heavily positive, 98,32% of all the references. Only 
negative references to Europe are made on 13 June 2013, in the discussions of Gezi 
Events, by the MPs from AKP and MHP on the grounds that Europe cannot be a reference 
point to evaluate the level of human rights and democracy in Turkey. For instance, 
Egemen Bağış, then the minister of the EU, criticizes the European Parliament’s decision 
criticizing the disproportionate use of police force during the Gezi Events by claiming 
that the EP has no authority to judge the level of democracy in Turkey (TBMM 2013a, 
Jun 13). For the remaining period, in any discussion of democratization, European 
                                                          
6 It does not necessarily mean Turkey is in the way of democratization during the period between June 2013 
and June 2015. In fact, the opposite is true, as explained in third chapter of this thesis. Nevertheless, this data 
still suggest the significant relevance of Europe for the human rights and democratization in Turkish domestic 
setting. 
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institutions served as a reference point to evaluate the democracy in Turkey. For instance, 
Hasip Kaplan, an MP from HDP, criticized the internet bans in Turkey on the grounds 
that they violate the European Convention for Human Rights (TBMM 2014c, Feb 5). 
The frequency trend of democratization follows a similar trajectory with the 
overall frequency of the use of the term Europe, analyzed before. It is expected since the 
democratization has the undoubtedly biggest volume among all categories in the 
discussions and can influence the general trajectory. Still, it is useful here to remember 
the discussion topics in order to understand the context of the discussions. 
As long as the parliament convenes, the MPs refer to Europe to criticize or justify 
a practice in Turkey in terms of democratization. Yet, in certain times, the relevance of 
Europe in democratization discussions rises significantly. Gezi Events is the main reason 
for the rise on June 2013, and the civil and political rights are mainly discussed in the 
parliament with reference to European conventions, the reports of the Council of Europe, 
and the EU documents. On November 2013, the various issues were addressed from the 
improper detention practices to the headscarf issue, from the right to assemble to the 
conditions of the workers. Similarly, a variety of issues are discussed on December 2013 
as well, due to the annual central budget talks, and the independence of the judiciary is in 
the focal point of the discussions. On February 2014, the concerns around the judicial 
independence led to another concentration of discussions on the level of democracy in 
Turkey because of the law proposed to change the structure of High Council of Judges 
and Prosecutors, increasing the influence of the executive branch over the decisions and 
 
Figure 4. Frequency of democratization discussions in relation to Europe, from June 
2013 to June 2015 
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Figure 5. Volume of democratization 
discussions in relation to Europe, in 
percentages 
structure of HSYK (Özbudun 2015). 
The same issue also caused another 
spike in November 2014. 
December 2014 is a good 
illustration of the scope of human 
rights and democracy discussions at 
TGNA. From political rights to social 
rights, from the independence of the 
judiciary to the independence of the 
media, and from the localization of the 
government to the domestic violence against women, a wide set of events is discussed in 
this interval. After a short decline at the beginning of 2015, the controversial domestic 
security bill, enchanting the powers of law enforcement agents and the executive officials 
disproportionally (Hürriyet Daily News 2005), resulted in the high volume of discussion 
on February and March 2015. 
All of these discussion topics indicate that the relevance of the European 
institutions and norms in Turkish political deliberation is still very high. However, except 
the annual budgetary talks, most of the increases in the volumes of discussion on the 
human rights and democratization happened because of the controversial acts and laws 
made by the government in the beginning. Hence, the high volume of the democracy 
discussion does not mean Turkey is in the way of democracy; instead, it could be 
interpreted as the opposite. Nevertheless, this data demonstrates the hegemonic position 
of European conventions and institutions as a major reference point for all political 
parties, as each one legitimized its criticism or justification for an issue over European 
institutions and practices. On the other hand, the appealing to Europe on human rights 
and democratization happens with varying degrees for each political party, and each of 
them has a different agenda as they focus on the different aspects of democratization 
discussions. The elaboration of these positions will be the subject of the fifth chapter. 
98,38%
1,62%
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4.1.2. Foreign Policy 
 According to Figure 2, foreign policy comes as the second most popular theme 
in the discussions related with Europe at TGNA. It is also one of the two themes whose 
total orientation is negative. In this subchapter, the general patterns of this theme will be 
presented considering Figure 6 and 7, and the data collected for this thesis. 
Turkish MPs’ view towards the relations with the EU, as Figure 7 clearly shows, 
is significantly negative. With the exception of December 2013, November 2014 and 
December 2014, the negative tone is dominant over the positive views in all the remaining 
months. The criticism towards the EU or European countries as an outsider having plans 
for Turkey and the Middle East, which conflicts with the interests of Turkey is commonly 
shared by all political parties, though content and the ideological tone differs from party 
to party. For instance, HDP representative İdris Baluken criticized the European foreign 
policy because of their imperialist intervention to the Middle East and the resulting surge 
of terrorist activities in the region (TBMM 2015a, Jan 6). On the other hand, MHP MP 
Özcan Yeniçeri also criticize European foreign policy on the Middle East, but with 
completely different framing. According to Yeniçeri, European powers intended to create 
divisions among the Muslims in the region and even argues that Europe is in the war with 
Islam (TBMM 2013e, Jul 7).  It is also very common for all political parties to blame each 
other for the collusion with European powers to the detriment of Turkey’s interests. 
Another strong theme is that Europe does not treat Turkey as an equal partner in its 
relations. Nevertheless, it is also widespread for all political parties to support 
Figure 6. Frequency of foreign policy discussions in relation to Europe, from June 
2013 to June 2015 
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Figure 7. Volume of foreign policy 
discussions in relation to Europe, in 
percentages 
collaborative efforts with European 
countries or the EU and criticize if the 
government fails to do so. For instance, 
CHP representative Erdal Aksünger 
express discontent over the weakining 
relations with the EU (TBMM 2014d, 
Apr 22), whereas HDP MP Hasip 
Kaplan critcizes the government 
because it  allowed the deterioration in 
the relations with Europe (TBMM 2014k, Dec 19). Again, the discussion topics will be 
summarized in this chapter and detailed in the following. 
 With the exceptions of June and November 2014, the foreign policy discussions 
rarely a response to a particular event. Instead, specific issues are repeatedly raised. Major 
themes among those are the EU’s role on the Cyprus issue, European support for PKK, 
the EU’s or European countries’ plans on the Middle East, energy cooperation with 
Europe, security relations with Europe, the Readmission Agreement, the foreign policies 
of the EU towards certain regions such as Palestine, East Turkistan, or Egypt. Except the 
energy cooperation with the EU, in all of these themes, the negative tone dominates the 
discussions and Europe is blamed either for its involvement or indifference. For its 
involvement in Egypt, it attracts criticisms. AKP MP Volkan Bozkır argues that the EU 
has recognized the coup d’etat in Egypt and criticizes it for this reason (TBMM 2013d, 
Jul 6). On the other hand, for MHP representative Reşat Doğru, the EU deserves to be 
blamed for its indifference towards the human rights violations in East Turkistan (TBMM 
2013c, Jul 3). Especially the Readmission Agreement attracts specifically negative 
comments, and interestingly, from all political parties. Its dramatic effect on the negative 
hike in June 2014 is noteworthy. All parties accuse the European Union over its treatment 
to the refugees and portray it as an imperialist, unreliable actor (TBMM 2014e, Jun 19; 
2014f Jun 24). The tone and the content of the criticism vary from party to party; yet, still, 
the negative comments dominate all the discussions. Only certain cooperation prospects 
in security and energy draw a positive interest from Turkish MPs; and even on those, the 
negative attitude could be stronger than expected, like the discussions on November 2014 
related with the authorization of Turkish Armed Forces for the security task forces of the 
38,87%
61,13%
Foreign+ Foreign-
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EU in Africa. For the rest of the issues, Turkish political parties exhibit a particularly 
critical attitude towards the foreign policy of the EU and Europe. 
4.1.3. Policy Adaptation 
 The accession to the EU involves an arduous task of implementing a very large, 
detailed acquis communautaire spanning very different policy areas from economy to 
social policy, from public procurement regulations to fisheries, from the environment to 
education (see European Commission 2016 for detailed coverage). The implementation 
of this legal framework is very demanding for newly-acceding countries, but in the long 
run, both the EU and the acceding countries benefit from this process in terms of economy 
and democracy (Moravscik and Vachudova 2003). An important question here is if the 
acceding country’s actors prefer the implementation of this acquis. The answer to this 
question for Turkey is a clear yes for the period under examination.7 Approximately 97% 
of the discussions on the policy adaptation is positive and consider the EU regulations 
and European practices as a reference to change Turkish policies and political practices 
of their interest. 
 Figure 8 demonstrates that there are only two instances in which the negative view 
has been put forward, though still significantly less frequent than the positive views: June 
2013 and November 2014. On the former, the minister of urbanization has argued that the 
European environment regulations are not appropriate for Turkey to adapt, and Turkey 
has its own conditions, even better policies than Europe (TBMM 2013b, June 25). 
Another critical evaluation emerges on November 2014, from CHP MP Ömer Süha 
Aldan, over the argument that Turkey should not implement every judicial adaptation to 
the EU and criticizes the arbitration practices in Turkey (TBMM 2014i, November 20). 
In all the rest of the discussion, the EU laws, regulations, and the practices in European 
countries has always been referred as a positive reference to criticize and replace Turkish 
laws and practices or to justify a policy based on its compatibility with the EU laws. 
 
                                                          
7 The EU acquis covers economy, foreign relations, and the fundemental rights as well. The classification of 
this thesis, however, seperates the adaptation to the economy, foreign relations, and democratization as seperate 
categories and includes the policy changes in the rest of the areas under the category of policy adaptation. 
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Figure 8. Frequency of policy adaptation discussions in relation to Europe, from 
June 2013 to June 2015 
Figure 9. Volume of policy adaptation 
discussions in relation to Europe, in 
percentages 
The themes in the policy 
adaptation discussion span in a variety of 
issues; yet in certain months, a specific 
policy area became the focal point of the 
discussions. On June 2013, under the 
influence of Gezi Events, a significant 
portion of the discussions, 13 out of 33 is 
about the environmental regulations in 
Turkey. On January 2015, 13 of 17 references in the policy adaptation discussion is about 
the shopping malls regulations in the EU during the deliberations over the Law 
Regulating Retail Trade. These months, however, are exceptional for the dispersion 
pattern for policy adaptation category, in which no single discussion point dominates the 
deliberations. The issue variance, in parallel, is vast for the policy adaptation discussions 
which makes it hard to categorize under specific headings. However, using more general 
labels, the following topics can be counted as significant themes: education policies, 
energy regulations, environmental regulations, fight against corruption, fiscal policies, 
judicial regulations, local municipality regulations, public health policies, public security 
policies, socioeconomic policies, transportation regulations, urban planning, and 
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workplace safety. Each political party, however, emphasize some of these issues, or some 
parts of these issues and disregard others. This point will be elaborated in the next chapter. 
4.1.4. Accession to the EU 
 For a candidate country to the EU, the commitment to the membership is a crucial 
factor. For Turkey, even though the process has been slowed dramatically, this did not 
bring a clear, corollary result as a negative preference formation for Turkish political 
parties. Since the data of the thesis does not cover a wide range of time to test the change 
in the preferences, analysis of the change in the stress for the EU membership cannot be 
provided. Nevertheless, the data of the period from June 2013 to June 2015 indicates that 
the accession to the EU is still a largely supported political goal, though with reservations. 
As Figure 10 demonstrates, approximately 82% of the references to the accession to the 
EU is made on favorable terms. The membership discussions are largely confined to the 
annual central budget discussions, as the peaks on December 2013, and December 2014 
proves in Figure 11. Only in July 2013, the negative tone is dominant over the positive 
tone. For the rest of the months, the positive references for the accession are in a clear 
majority. Moreover, the positive pattern in the accession discussion in contrast with the 
foreign policy discussions, For the rest of the months, the positive references for the 
 
Figure 10. Frequency of accession discussions in relation to Europe, from June 2013 
to June 2015 
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Figure 11. Volume of accession 
discussions in relation to Europe, in 
percentages 
accession are in a clear majority. 
Moreover, the positive pattern in the 
accession discussion in contrast with 
the foreign policy discussions, in which 
the negative tone is dominant for most 
of the period. On June 2014, when the 
negative comments against Europe on 
the foreign policy rocketed, the 
discussion on the accession stays unaffected. This means that the preferences of Turkish 
political parties for the relations with Europe are moving independently from the goal of 
membership to the EU.  Lastly, it is noteworthy that the accession to the EU is not debated 
in relation to any discussion topic; rather, it is held and discussed on its own without being 
part of any other agenda. 
4.1.5. Economy 
 Economy acted as the most important driving force behind the European 
integration from the very beginning and continued to be so for each phase, mainly thanks 
to the pressures from the economic and political interest groups. (Moravscik 1998). The 
candidate countries usually apply for the membership with the aims of economic 
flourishment and development, whereas the member countries welcome new applications 
for mostly economic reasons as well (Moravcsik and Vachudova 2003). Turkish domestic 
preferences do not conflict with this picture. As Figure 12 summarizes, about 86% of all 
references in economy discussions hold a favorable position for the economic relations 
with Europe and the EU, with a presence of a fair share of criticism. 
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Figure 12. Volume of economy 
discussions in relation to Europe, in 
percentages 
The adaptation to the European 
economy and its requirements is the most 
common agenda during the economy 
discussions. The discussions on the 
electronic money, the adaptation to the EU 
fiscal rules and regulations, the 
compatibility of Turkish products to 
European standards, the consumer rights, 
the compatibility of Turkish financial market to European rules, and even the need to be 
prepared for the effects of Common Agricultural Policy when Turkey becomes a member 
can be counted for the adaptation agenda. Another significant theme for the economy 
discussions is the need to re-structure the Turkish economy. The debates on the innovative 
industry, the support for the small and medium-sized enterprises, the subsidies for the 
farmers, fisheries, and industrial areas, the inclusion of women into the economy, the 
energy production, and the organization of vocations in the economy is made with 
reference to European rules and practices. Of course, the economic relations with 
European countries and the EU is also a significant topic for Turkish MPs. Especially the 
trade relations with the EU and the inclusion of Turkey to Trans-Pacific Partnership 
negotiations are repeatedly risen, though their positive or negative tone may vary. In 
addition, the Customs Union Agreement with the EU is also discussed very often, mostly 
in negative connotations. 
Similar to the accession debates, the economy discussions are not much affected 
by the external agendas; they are discussed within their own dynamics usually. The peak 
points in frequency of the deliberations on the economy are the result of the evaluations 
of the economic practices during the annual central budget discussions. 
86,35%
13,65%
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Figure 13. Frequency of economy discussions in relation to Europe, from June 2013 
to June 2015  
4.1.6. Politics in Europe 
 In a globalized world order, the influence of the developments within a nation 
does not stop its borders. For the relations between Turkey and the European countries, 
this is particularly important because of their common political, economic, and social 
complex interactions. Though the volume of the discussions on the political development 
in Europe is not as high as democratization or the foreign policy of the European 
countries, it has still an important place. 
The debates on the political developments show a particularly negative tone 
towards Europe. Together with the debates on the foreign policy of the EU and European 
countries, these two debate clusters shape the negative tone towards Europe as both 
demonstrate a heavily negative orientation. 
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Figure 14. Volume of discussions on 
politics on Europe, in percentages 
Only in four months, the 
positive view is prevalent over the 
negative views: November 2013, 
December 2013, January 2014, and 
February 2014. In all of those, the 
positive comments are made for the 
fight against corruption, the political 
culture which holds the office-holders 
accountable and the further integration 
efforts in Europe. On the other hands, Turkish MPs have more criticism than praise for 
the political development in Europe. Main criticism points are related to the status of 
Turks in Europe and discrimination towards them, the rise of the far-right in key European 
countries, Islamophobia and xenophobia in Europe. These factors are behind every major 
peak in Figure 15. The support that PKK or Armenian lobby gets in some European 
countries or institutions attracts a particularly negative reaction as well. 
 
Figure 15. Frequency of discussions on politics in Europe, from June 2013 to June 
2015 
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4.1.7. Conclusions for the Discussions on Europe 
 Considering the weight of the discussions summarized in Figure 2, the general 
points of discussions and the trends in six categories of deliberation are analyzed: human 
rights and democratization, foreign policy, policy adaptation, accession to the EU, 
economy, and the politics in Europe. The chapter reached the conclusion that European 
norms and institutions hold a particularly dominant positive reference point for the 
discussions on the human rights and democratization, and policy adaptation. In economy 
and accession to the EU deliberations, a relatively minor objections rate persists, but the 
significant majority of the comments has a positive connotation. On the negative side of 
the coin, the foreign policy of the European countries and the EU, and the political 
developments in European countries stand as a source of vital friction points. To sum up, 
this analysis of general trends yields that Turkish political parties almost unanimously 
favor the transfer the democratic norms and public policies from Europe, favor the 
economic relations with Europe and want to be member of the EU, yet has critical 
negativity towards the goals of the European countries and the European Union on foreign 
policy and the political developments in Europe. However, the thesis has no 
anthropomorphized portrayal of Turkey as a single, rational actor. As explained in the 
second chapter, based on principles of the liberal theory of international relations, the 
thesis assumes that the preferences of the domestic actors are critical, and thus it covers 
the deliberations in TGNA to detect these preferences. To reach this goal, all of these 
discussion points will be examined in detail in the following chapter. Before doing so, 
however, the evaluation results of the comparison between the findings reached through 
the use of Europe and the European Union should be discussed. 
4.2. Discussions on the European Union in TGNA from June 2013 to June 2015 
 The difference between the results of the keyword searches “Europe” and 
“European Union” and EU” is caused by two reasons. First, the keyword search for 
“Europe” already includes the results for the European Union but excludes the references 
which only use the abbreviation “EU.” Any discussion that calls the Union over its 
abbreviation is excluded from the first results. Secondly, the keyword search for 
“European Union and EU” does not include any discussion referencing other European 
53 
 
institutions such as the Council of Europe. Despite these differences, there is no clear 
change between the patterns between the two datasets. When compared with the Figure 
1, the Figure 16 does not show any clear change on the general patterns, except the drop 
on February 2014, which is result of the fact that discussion of the Domestic Security Bill 
and Law of Military Judges is mostly over the conventions of the Council of Europe and 
does involve only a few mentions of the EU. In terms of positive and negative 
orientations, there is no significant change except the politics category, whose negative 
tones sharply increase in the absence of positive comments for “Europe.” Figure 17 
demonstrates the positive, and negative percentages for each category. Overall, however, 
the orientation for each category stays in the same direction. In most of the categories, 
the negative tone has increased slightly, between 0,08% and 4,99%.  Only in the policy 
adaptation, the positive orientation increased, though again slightly, with 2,65%. The 
general patterns for each category have similar characteristics as well, again except 
February 2014 on democratization category. To avoid the replication of the same 
comments, the graphic summaries of each category is presented in Appendix 1, together 
with the graphs of Europe.  
  
Figure 16. Frequency of the positive and negative references to the EU, from June 
2013 to June 2015 
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Table 3. Comparison between the positive-negative orientation results for the keyword 
searches “Europe” and “European Union and EU” in percentages 
 
 
There is, however, a sharp drop in the volume of the deliberations. The number of 
mention of Europe from June 2013 to June 2015 in Turkish Parliament is 2523, whereas 
it is 1664 for European Union. Most of this drop is caused by the change in the volume 
of democratization discussions. It is because of the exclusion of other European 
institutions such as the European Court of Human Rights and the Council of Europe from 
the results. For the summary of the changes in the volumes, see Figure 18. 
 
Table 4. Comparison between the number of reference results for the keyword 
searches “Europe” and “European Union and EU” 
 
 
Even though the patterns of the data remained same, the drop in the volume of the 
discussions resulted in an important change in the order of the categories in the Pareto 
chart. As Figure 19 indicates, the dramatic leading position of the category of the human 
rights and democratization has changed, yet still, it stays in the first place. Then comes 
the positive views towards accession, which pushed the negative views on the foreign 
policy of the EU to the third place. In addition, the relative position of the positive views 
Category 
codes 
The results for “Europe” in 
percentages 
The results for “European Union and 
EU” in percentages 
Positive Negative Positive Negative 
General 79,51% 20,49% 74,52% 25,48% 
Democ 98,38% 1,62% 98,30% 1,70% 
Foreign 38,87% 61,13% 38,39% 61,61% 
Policy 96,61% 3,39% 99,26% 0,74% 
Access 82,18% 17,82% 80,56% 19,44% 
Economy 86,35% 13,65% 79,03% 20,97% 
Politics 24,24% 75,76% 9,52% 90,48% 
Category 
codes 
The results for “Europe” in 
percentages 
The results for “European Union and 
EU” in percentages 
Positive Negative Positive Negative 
General 2006 517 1240 424 
Democ 1033 17 404 7 
Foreign 206 324 167 268 
Policy 228 8 135 1 
Access 249 54 315 76 
Economy 215 34 196 52 
Politics 24 75 2 19 
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on the economy also increased and surpassed the positive views on the foreign policy and 
the policy adaptation. 
Based on these results, it could be argued that the importance of European 
institutions such as ECHR or the Council of Europe is equally important as a reference 
point for democratization discussions of Turkish political parties. On the other hand, the 
EU itself is still very influential in terms of its relevance on the democratization 
discussions. The decrease in the position of the criticism of the foreign policy may be 
attributed to seeing the European nation-states, rather than the EU, as a responsible and 
effective actor in the foreign policy. The increase in the position of the economy and the 
accession categories is also noteworthy. The significant decrease in the volume of the 
politics category is expected since the criticisms are related with the internal 
developments of European states, rather than the EU in general. 
 
Figure 17. Pareto chart describing the distribution of the categories in the discussion 
of the EU, from June 2013 to June 2015 
 
4.3. Conclusions 
 Taking all these analyzes together, the chapter finishes with the conclusions that 
European institutions and the EU are very influential in the democratization discussions 
in Turkey. Particularly, the EU is seen as a very vital reference for the policy transfer for 
Turkish political parties. For the discussions on the economy and the accession, though 
the majority of the references are positive, an important share of criticism also persists. 
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This negativity significantly increases and culminates in the discussion on the foreign 
policy of European countries and the political developments in Europe. The general 
picture, then, seems like the following: Turkish political parties seek the democratic norm 
and policy transfer from Europe, and favor the cooperation in economy, which may be 
the very reason behind the support for Turkish accession to the EU. However, the same 
parties do not favor European policies on the international scenes and the political 
developments in those countries. In parallel, the major problem could be sought in the 
political and international factors, rather than economic, policy-oriented, or ideational 
factors. Nevertheless, all of these results have a meaning only when the positions of the 
political parties are clarified, and their weights in the discussions are understood. In the 
next chapter, the positions of each political parties in all these categories are elaborated 
for this reason. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE VIEWS AND PREFERENCES OF EACH POLITICAL PARTY 
In the previous chapter, the general trends of the preferences of the main political 
parties are presented. The frequency of the references to Europe and the EU, the main 
discussion topics, and the weight of the issue categories are clarified. This picture, 
however, needs to be complemented with the detailed examination of the views and 
preferences of the parties and their positive or negative orientations in each issue 
category. By doing so, the aim of the thesis would be reached, that is the detailed 
evaluation of the views and preferences of each political party from June 2013 to June 
2015 regarding Europe. 
5.1. The Distribution of Discussion Categories for Each Political Party 
 Following a similar blueprint which is applied to the general trends in the previous 
chapter, the distribution of discussion categories for each political party is essential to 
understand the orientations of perceptions towards Europe and its content. Hence, in this 
subchapter, the Pareto distribution of the references to Europe will be analyzed for each 
political party with an aim to portray the relevance of Europe for different political 
agendas. Then, in the following parts, the main discussion points and arguments of the 
main political parties will be clarified for each discussion category. 
 Figure 20 demonstrates that the positive references to Europe for the 
democratization discussions have the highest weight in the words of AKP’s 
representatives, with approximate 25%. The positive use of Europe in foreign policy and 
accession categories follows it respectively. Though with decreasing shares, the MPs 
from AKP made positive references in economy and policy adaptation discussions as 
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well. The negative references to Europe are dominant over the positive ones only in the 
discussions on the politics in Europe. The figure also shows that, for AKP, the primary 
relevance of Europe is the democratization and human rights, foreign policy, accession 
process to the EU, economy, policy adaptation and lastly politics in Europe, since their 
total percentage is above 95%. However, for AKP, most the positive uses of Europe in 
democratization discussions have mostly defensive connotation. In other words, AKP 
Figure 18. Pareto chart describing the distribution of the categories in AKP’s 
discussion of Europe, from June 2013 to June 2015 
 
refers to European institutions and values mostly to claim that the existing political 
arrangements in Turkey are democratic and in line with European standards. Thus, the 
positive mentions to European institutions and values are more likely related with the 
controversial and undemocratic practices of the AKP government in this period, rather 
than with a progressive agenda on the democratization of Turkey. Moreover, the gap 
between the accession and the policy adaptation categories are also meaningful. Though 
AKP representatives declared the accession to the EU as a strategic goal several times, 
the very content of the accession process, which is the adaptation of the EU acquis, comes 
after the foreign and economic relations with the EU in terms of their weights in the 
deliberations. In addition, AKP is one of the two parties which expressed negative views 
on the policy adaptation. Considering these patterns, it follows that AKP’s main points of 
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interest in relations with Europe are the foreign and economic relations. AKP MPs defend 
the practices of the government in the face of the criticism from the opposition with 
reference to the European institutions; however, they rarely make progressive mentions. 
In parallel to the general trends, the main criticism of AKP MPs towards Europe is mostly 
related to foreign relations and the political developments in Europe.  
Figure 19. Pareto chart describing the distribution of the categories in CHP’s 
discussion of Europe, from June 2013 to June 2015 
 
 CHP’s main focus is on the democratization discussions for the period from June 
2013 to June 2015, as Figure 21 suggests, with a dramatic volume of references, two times 
of AKP. More than half of the references to Europe by CHP MPs are done in relation to 
human rights and democratization, mostly as a criticism of the government’s practices. 
Also, CHP representatives made no single mention of Europe in negative tones during 
the democratization discussions. For the following foreign relations category, though, the 
negative use is dominant over the positive ones. The MPs from CHP made positive 
references to Europe in policy adaptation, economic relations, accession to the EU, 
culture, and identity. Similar to AKP, the relevance of Europe for CHP agenda revolves 
around democratization, foreign relations, policy adaptation, economic relations, 
accession process, and the political developments in Europe, as their total percentage is 
approximately 98% of all mentions of Europe by CHP representatives. CHP differs from 
AKP in three respects. First, the references to European institutions and values are done 
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mostly in a progressive manner. Second, CHP’s criticism of Europe is not limited to 
European politics; it also criticizes the relations with the European Union and European 
countries, and stress that the relations are mostly built on unequal treatment. Third, CHP 
particularly stresses on the policy adaptation, in addition to its support for Turkish 
accession to the EU. Considering all these trends, CHP’s agenda related with EU is mostly 
about the democratization of Turkish politics and criticism towards the AKP 
government’s practices; and this agenda supports the economic relation, the accession 
process, and the adaptation to the EU. Yet, the same party disfavors treatment of the EU 
and European countries towards Turkey and has important discontents about the political 
developments in Europe. 
  The Pareto distribution of MHP’s use of Europe in parliamentary deliberations 
differs from other parties significantly due to its different distribution order and the 
dominant orientation in key categories. Figure 22 illustrates that the share of criticism to 
the EU and European countries in foreign relations has a leading position among other 
categories and its main orientation is critically negative since about 30% of all references 
to Europe are about the foreign relations and only 2% of them is positive. Though the 
positive references in terms of democratization and human rights come second in terms 
of its weight; it is also crucial that MHP made negative references to Europe in those 
discussions, similar to AKP. Crucially, MHP’s approach to the accession process is 
dominated by negative comments. Yet, the difference between positive and negative 
comments on the process is not significant since the number of positive mentions is 30, 
whereas the negative references are 45. Still, the fact that the negative use of Europe in 
the foreign relations and accession categories have a considerable weight among other 
categories is important to map the MHP’s overall view towards Europe. In the 
deliberations on the policy adaptation and the economic relations, however, MHP favors 
the relations with Europe and takes its practices and conventions as references to be 
implemented in Turkey. Lastly, MHP also has a negative outlook towards the political 
developments in Europe, mostly due to its concern for the Turkish minorities living in 
Europe. Overall, considering all these trends, MHP’s stance towards the EU and Europe 
has significant negative elements, unlike any other political party. It does not favor the 
level of foreign relations with Europe, as well as the accession process to the EU. In 
addition, it criticizes European countries over their treatment of Turkish minorities living 
there. On the other hand, MHP is open to the contributions from Europe on the 
61 
 
democratization process in Turkey, the policy adaptation to the EU, and lastly to the 
economic relations with Europe, though with a certain critical reservation for each 
category.  
Figure 20. Pareto chart describing the distribution of the categories in MHP’s 
discussion of Europe, from June 2013 to June 2015 
 
 Among all political parties, HDP differs with its major share allocated for the 
democratization discussions during the parliamentary deliberations. Figure 23 suggests 
that the share of democratization category among others for the use of Europe in 
parliamentary deliberations is about 65%.  All these mentions criticize the practices of 
the Turkish government on various grounds, for different time periods. All the remaining 
categories have a minor relevance; however, only with the addition of the foreign 
relations, accession, policy adaptation, economy, and political developments categories 
the total share come closer to hundred percent. Among those, only in the foreign relations 
category, HDP representatives put a mostly negative view forward and criticize European 
governments by claiming they have imperialist plans on the Middle-East (TBMM 2015a, 
Jan 6). In the other categories, HDP MPs held a favorable position towards Europe and 
supported the accession process. In addition, among all political parties, HDP is the only 
party which makes mostly positive references to the political developments in Europe. 
All in all, these trends suggest that Europe’s relevance for HDP is mostly related to the 
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democratization in Turkey. Though HDP holds an unfavorable position in foreign 
relations against European countries, it supports the policy adaptation, the economic 
relations, and the accession process to the European Union. HDP is the only political 
party which has a positive view of the political developments in Europe. 
Figure 21. Pareto chart describing the distribution of the categories in HDP’s 
discussion of Europe, from June 2013 to June 2015 
 
 
 In this subchapter, the main tendencies of each political party are clarified, and 
what they have stressed in the discussions is elaborated. By using the six-fold 
categorization on the contents of the deliberations, the views of each political party are 
presented in general terms. In the following subchapter, each category will be analyzed 
with greater detail, and the views and the preferences of each political party will be 
elaborated further. 
5.2. The Views of Main Political Parties on Democratization and Human Rights 
 As indicated before, the period between June 2013 and June 2015 marks Turkey’s 
backsliding into authoritarian government. As a result of this context, the democratization 
and human rights are hotly debated in Turkish Parliament. However, as Figure 24 
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demonstrates, these discussions are dominated by two political parties: CHP and HDP. 
AKP comes in the third position regarding the number of references to Europe, whereas 
MHP is in the last position. In addition, AKP and MHP are the only political parties which 
refer to Europe in a negative tone in the discussions of democratization and human rights. 
Figure 22. Views of each political party on Europe in discussions of democratization 
and human rights, from June 2013 to June 2015 
 
 The agendas of the political parties differ as well. CHP’s main focus in the 
democratization discussions is the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary, the 
human right violations done by the government, the freedom of expression, the social 
rights, and the freedom of assembly. All of these concerns also raised by HDP as well; 
also, HDP particularly interested in the conditions of the prisons and the right of self-
governance in local administrations. MHP’s references also include the independence of 
the judiciary and the rule of law; in addition, MHP brings the social rights and especially 
the rights of the disabled people to the discussions. For the discussions on the 
democratization, AKP holds a defensive position most often, as the representatives from 
AKP argues that the status quo in Turkey and the practices of the government is already 
democratic and in line with the European norms and institutions. For instance, according 
to Faruk Çelik, an MP from AKP and the Minister of Work and the Social Security, the 
social rights of the workers, and especially the mining workers are in the line with 
European standards (TBMM 2014g, Jul 16). 
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5.3. The Views of Main Political Parties on Foreign Policy 
 Foreign policy is one of the two areas the negative orientation dominates over the 
positive views. Figure 25 summarizes which political parties contribute to this negativity 
most. CHP and MHP are the most vocal critics of Europe and the European Union in the 
realm of the international relations. CHP’s position, on the other hand, is rather mixed 
since it also refers to Europe in positive terms many times. In contrast, MHP rarely 
supports Europe in international relations and represent a visibly anti-Europe stance. AKP 
is the only party whose the number of positive references exceeds the negative ones; 
however, AKP MPs criticizes Europe many times as well, even call the EU as an 
unreliable partner. Still, in the end, AKP tend to favor the cooperation with the EU and 
European countries in foreign relations most among political parties in TGNA.  
Figure 23. Views of each political party on Europe in discussions of foreign policy, 
from June 2013 to June 2015 
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 All political parties criticize the EU’s involvement in the Middle East. All political 
parties argue Europe intervenes in the region with ill-intentions plans, and they do not 
frame the interests of Turkey along with Europe in the region. Each political party, on the 
other hand, sees a different problem. AKP, for instances, criticizes the European 
recognition of the coup d’état happened in Egypt. CHP and MHP, in contrast, frames the 
activities of Europe in the Middle East as part of an imperialist project. HDP criticizes 
the plans of Europeans for the region it calls Kurdistan.  
Another significant criticism of Europe is related to its treatment towards Turkey. 
Especially CHP and MHP argues that Europe does not treat Turkey as an equal partner. 
This criticism has been raised especially during the discussion of the Readmission 
Agreement. Even AKP claims that Europe applies double-standard to Turkey in their 
relations. In addition, AKP, CHP, and MHP criticize the EU due to its role in the Cyprus 
issue ad its alleged support for PKK. Furthermore, the political parties raise certain crisis 
areas to the agenda of TGNA several times and criticize European countries either for 
their involvement or non-involvement. MHP repeatedly brings the issue of East 
Turkistan, the northwestern part of China where a significant number of Uighur Turks 
live, and criticize European countries because of their silence. In another instance, AKP 
blames European countries due to their silence to the Palestinian issue and for their 
recognition of the coup d’état happened in Egypt.  
Despite all these criticisms, Turkish political parties favor the cooperation with 
Europe. The opposition parties always criticize the government if the relations between 
Turkey and the EU sours. In addition, the cooperation on the energy is also supported by 
all political parties. The cooperation on the security, too, is supported by AKP, CHP, and 
MHP; yet, in specific issues, like the EU-led operations in Republic of Central Africa and 
Mali, the criticism towards the imperialist goals of the EU became more influential. 
5.4. The Views of Main Political Parties on the Policy Adaptation 
The policy adaptation towards Europe is a commonly-shared priority for all 
political parties in TGNA. There are only two instances in which an MP expressed 
negative views on policy issue on Europe. On the first one, Erdoğan Bayraktar, then the 
minister of urbanization, has argued that the European environment regulations are not 
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appropriate for Turkey to adapt, and Turkey has its own conditions, even better policies 
than Europe (TBMM 2013b, June 25). On the second instance, Ömer Süha Aldan from 
CHP, criticizes blind transfer of arbitration practices from Europe, and argues that Turkey 
should not implement every judicial adaptation to the EU and criticizes the arbitration 
practices in Turkey (TBMM 2014i, November 20). For all the remaining the deliberation 
in TGNA about the policy adaptation to the EU, the EU laws, regulations, and the 
practices in European countries always been referred positively.  
Figure 24. Views of each political party on Europe in discussions of policy adaptation 
to the EU, from June 2013 to June 2015 
 
Most of the themes expressed in the former chapter, on the policy adaptation 
discussions, are not concentrated under a single political party; however, it is true for 
some of those. For instance, MHP brought the fight against the drug use in the schools to 
the agenda of TGNA several times. The environmental regulations, the energy 
regulations, especially those on the renewable energies, the urban planning, and the 
workplace safety are under the focus of CHP and HDP, particularly. In addition, HDP 
prioritizes the discussion on the local municipality regulations in Europe and defends for 
autonomous local governance. AKP, on the other hand, having the advantage of holding 
the executive branch, made many references in each theme, and expressed its intention to 
adopt the EU laws and regulations. Despite this advantage, it falls behind CHP regarding 
the use of the term Europe in the policy adaptation discussions 
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5.5. The Views of Main Political Parties on Accession to the EU 
The discussion on the accession to EU is oriented in a positive direction for all the 
periods. Interestingly, AKP leads in the use of Europe in the positive reference to the 
accession to the EU. CHP and HDP follow it in terms of the volume of the discussions. 
MHP, on the other hand, differentiates from other political parties with its constant 
criticism towards the accession period. The MPs from MHP repeatedly argues that 
Turkey does not need the EU and alternative forms of cooperation may be established 
with other countries, implying for a union for Turkic states. In addition, the MHP 
representative stress that the EU will not accept Turkey to the Union; but, in the 
meantime, Turkish interests and values are under harm.  
Most of the positive references to the accession to the EU by AKP MPs usually 
includes the declaration that the EU process has strategic importance for Turkey and 
AKP. However, CHP and HDP disagree with AKP and argues that the AKP government 
has shifted from the EU process. The most of the positive references of these parties came 
from their such criticisms of AKP. 
Figure 25. Views of each political party on Europe in discussions of accession to the 
EU, from June 2013 to June 2015
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5.6. The Views of Main Political Parties on Economy 
 The views of the main political parties in TGNA on the economy is positive in 
overall. AKP leads the volume of positive references to the EU in economy discussions. 
CHP, MHP, and HDP follow it respectively. 
 In these discussions, AKP’s primary focus is on the trade relations with Europe 
and the adaptation to European markets. CHP, MHP, and HDP share a common ground 
stressing the support for small and medium-sized enterprises and the subsidies for the 
farmers, fisheries. MHP sees European economic model to be followed, in terms of the 
organization of the economy; however, its statements exhibits protectionist inclinations, 
as the representatives of MHP claims the Customs Union with the EU harms Turkish 
economy. The negativity of AKP and CHP comes from their criticism of the quotes 
employed by the EU in its agricultural trade with Turkey. CHP also criticizes that Turkey 
is not part of Tans-Pacific Partnership negotiations. 
Figure 26. Views of each political party on Europe in discussions of economy, from 
June 2013 to June 2015 
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5.7. The Views of Main Political Parties on Politics in Europe 
 The deliberations of the politics in Europe is one of the two categories the negative 
orientations dominate the discussions, in addition to the foreign policy category. 
 The most of the positive references to the political development in Europe are 
done to praise the fight against corruption and the political culture which holds the office-
holder accountable, and the support of some European circles for the cooperation between 
Turkey and Europe. The former two factors are reiterated by CHP and HDP many times, 
whereas the last one is highlighted by AKP. MHP, on the other, as the leading critic in 
this theme, repeatedly brought the status of Turks living in Europe and blamed Europe 
for the discrimination against Turkish minorities. In addition, MHP also alleges that PKK 
and Armenian lobby gets strong support from European countries. Moreover, the rise of 
the far-right in Europe became a subject of criticism for AKP, CHP, and HDP.  
 
Figure 27. Views of each political party on Europe in discussions of the politics in 
Europe, from June 2013 to June 2015 
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5.8. Conclusions 
 The aim of this chapter is to portray the positions of the main Turkish political 
parties on Europe concerning the six categories, whose general patterns are presented in 
the fourth chapter. The detailed picture of the views and preferences of the political parties 
helps to articulate the patterns described before. 
 The strongest theme in the deliberations in Turkish Parliament concerning Europe 
is the democratization and human rights. All parties make references to European 
institutions and values as an important legitimizing point to further their arguments. 
However, CHP and MHP’s weight in the discussions is important. Approximately 75% 
of the all references to Europe regarding the democratization and human rights is made 
by these two parties. MHP’s share does not go beyond 8%. AKP’s references, on the other 
hand, is mostly defensive and lacks a progressive agenda. In this regard, the significant 
relevance of Europe in democratization discussions is mostly thanks to CHP and HDP. It 
is also important that all the opposition parties stress the independence of the judiciary 
and the rule of law in their discussions.  
 The views on the foreign policy is negative in overall direction; however, AKP’s 
favorable references exceeds the negative uses. Most of the positive references to the 
foreign policy of European countries are made by AKP and CHP. HDP seems relatively 
uninterested to these discussions, whereas MHP has significant number of negative 
references to the Europe. All the political parties see Europe as an unreliable partner and 
criticize it in various ground. The criticism to the foreign policy towards the Middle East 
and the perception of unfair treatment towards Turkey by Europe are shared by all 
political parties. Turkish political parties, on the other hand, see many cooperation 
possibilities with Europe as well. The energy cooperation is supported by all political 
parties, whereas the security cooperation is back by AKP, CHP, and MHP. 
 Policy adaptation is almost unanimously favored by all political parties. The 
highest number of references to Europe in policy adaptation discussions belongs to CHP. 
AKP, HDP, and MHP follows it respectively. Nevertheless, very few issues are 
particularly stressed by a specific political party. The environmental regulations, the 
renewable energy policies, urban planning, and the workplace safety are the special 
interest areas of CHP and HDP. HDP also stresses the local municipality regulations in 
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Europe. MHP, on the other hand, is particularly interested in the fight against the drug 
use, during the discussions of Europe. 
 Despite their common interest in the policy adaptation, Turkish political parties 
are not unanimous when it comes to the Turkey’s accession to the EU. MHP stands as a 
significant naysayer. MHP representatives voices many reservations for the accession 
process. All other parties, on the other hand, declares their support for the process. 
 Economy is another area for which all political parties shares common positive 
orientation yet differs in terms of their specific interests. AKP focuses on the trade 
relations with Europe and the adaptation to the European markets. CHP, MHP, and HDP 
make references to Europe for the support for small and medium-sized enterprises, and 
the subsidies for the farmers and fisheries. MHP’s support for the economic relations is 
mixed though since it does not favor the Customs Union with the EU. 
 Lastly, all the main political parties in Turkish Parliament has an unfavorable view 
towards the political development in Europe. MHP is the main critic of the politics in 
Europe, due to its criticism to the status of Turks in Europe and its allegations that 
European countries backs PKK and Armenian lobby. AKP, CHP, and HDP’s main focus 
is, on the other hand the rising far-right political movements in Europe. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS 
 This thesis aims to describe and evaluate the preferences of main political parties 
in Turkey for the period from June 2013 to June 2015 by analyzing the parliamentary 
deliberations. The empirical findings of the thesis are relevant both for the literature on 
Turkey-EU relations and on Europeanization in Turkey. The results of the study 
demonstrate the views and preferences of main Turkish political parties on Europe and 
the relevance of Europe and the European Union in Turkish domestic setting. 
 The findings for the general patterns suggests that European institutions and the 
EU are very influential in the democratization and human rights discussions in Turkey. 
Especially CHP and HDP refers to the European norms and institutions to criticize the 
practices in Turkey. The EU is also seen as a significant reference for the policy 
adaptation. All political parties see the laws and regulations in Europe as examples which 
should be emulated to Turkish setting. The views towards Europe in the realm of economy 
and the accession process of Turkey is mostly positive; yet, there is an important degree 
of criticism to the accession process as well as improved economic relations with Europe, 
most of which comes from the MHP’s representatives. The views in the foreign relations 
and the political developments in Europe is dominated by the unfavorable outlook, shared 
by all political parties.  
 All these finding can be narrating as the following: Turkish political parties, 
mostly the opposition, seek the democratic practices to be emulated to Turkey. All 
political parties share the common stance for the policy from Europe. The views of the 
political parties favor economic cooperation with the EU in economy, led by the ruling 
AKP. However, the political parties in Turkey have no favorable perception towards 
Europe in foreign policy and their domestic political developments. Thus, it can be 
concluded that the major problems between Turkey and the European Union is the 
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political and international problems, according to the main political parties in Turkey. 
The same parties are open for collaboration on economy, the policy transfer, and the norm 
transfer. 
 These results suggest that Europe is still very relevant for the political discussions 
in Turkey. In this sense, it is hard to call Turkey as a de-Europeanizing country especially 
when the opposition parties’ views are also included in the analysis. The findings also 
imply that, for Turkey, the economic collaboration with Europe is the common agenda 
despite the numerous challenges in the foreign policy including a deep of level of distrust 
to Europe, and the domestic politics of European countries such as the rise of the alt-right 
movements. Turkish political parties are also very receptive to the policy transfer from 
Europe. On the democratization, the opposition perceive Europe as an important 
reference point, but the low level of AKP’s involvement in the discussions may be 
interpreted as an obstacle for further progress in this area. All in all, with a liberal theory 
perspective, the different schemes for the future of Turkish-EU relations may be drawn 
based on the views and the preferences of the domestic political actors in Turkey, 
especially in terms of economic cooperation and the policy transfer. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
74 
 
 
REFERENCES 
Aka, H. Burç, and Nergiz Özkural. 2015. “Turkey and the European Union: A Review 
of Turkey’s Readmission Agreement.” The European Legacy 20(3): 255–72.  
Almond, Gabriel A., and G. Bingham. Powell. 1966. Comparative Politics a 
Developmental Approach. Boston, MA: Little, Brown, and Company. 
Alpan, Başak, and Thomas Diez. 2014. “The Devil Is in the ‘Domestic’? European 
Integration Studies and the Limits of Europeanization in Turkey.” Journal of Balkan 
and Near Eastern Studies 16(1): 1–10. 
Aydın, Senem and E. Fuat Keyman. 2004. “European Integration and the 
Transformation of Turkish Politics.” EU-Turkey Working Paper No. 2, Center for 
European Policy Studies, Brussels, Belgium. 
Aydın-Düzgit, Senem. 2015. “European Parliament ‘Doing’ Europe: Unravelling the 
Right-Wing Culturalist Discourse on Turkey’s Accession to the EU.” Journal of 
Language and Politics 14(1): 154-74. 
Aydın-Düzgit, Senem, and Ali Çarkoğlu. 2008. “Turkey: Reforms for A Consolidated 
Democracy.” In International Actors, Democratization and the Rule of Law: Anchoring 
Democracy?, eds. Amichai Magen and Leonardo Morlino. New York, NY: Routledge, 
120-55. 
Aydın-Düzgit, Senem, and Alper Kaliber. 2016. “Encounters with Europe in an Era of 
Domestic and International Turmoil: Is Turkey a De-Europeanising Candidate 
Country?” South European Society and Politics 21(1): 1–14. 
Balkır, Canan. 1998. “The Customs Union and Beyond.” In The Political Economy of 
Turkey in the Post-Soviet Era: Going West and Looking East?, Libby Rittenberg ed. 
Westport, CT: Praeger, 51-77. 
Baldwin, David A. 2016. Power and International Relations: A Conceptual Approach. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Bilgiç, Esra Ercan, and Zehra Kafkaslı. 2013. Gencim, Özgürlükçüyüm, Ne İstiyorum: 
Gezi Parkı Anket Sonuçları Gencim, Özgürlükçüyüm, Ne İstiyorum: Gezi Parkı Anket 
Sonuçları. Istanbul, Turkey: Istanbul Bilgi University Press. rep. 
75 
 
Bölükbaşı, H Tolga, Ebru Ertugal, and Saime Özçürümez. 2010. “The Impact of the EU 
on Turkey: Toward Streamlining Europeanisation as a Research Programme.” 
European Political Science 9(4): 464–80. 
Börzel, Tanja A., and Thomas Risse. 2000. “When Europe Hits Home: Europeanization 
and Domestic Change.” European Integration Online Papers (EIOP) 4(15). 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=302768 (May 8, 2018). 
Börzel, Tanja A., and Thomas Risse. 2003. "Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact of 
Europe." In The Politics Of Europeanization, Kevin Featherstone and Claudio M. 
Radaelli eds. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 57-80. 
CNN Türk. 2014. “Orta Afrika ve Mali’ye Asker Gönderecek Tezkere Kabul Edildi.” 
CNN Turk. https://www.cnnturk.com/haber/turkiye/orta-afrika-ve-maliye-asker-
gonderecek-tezkere-kabul-edildi (Jun 1, 2018). 
Council of the European Communities. 1992. EEC-Turkey Association Agreement and 
Protocols and Other Basic Texts. Brussels, Belgium. 
Council of the European Union. 1993. Copenhagen European Council 21 and 22 June 
1993 Conclusions of the Presidency. Brussels, Belgium. 
Council of the European Union. 1997. Luxembourg European Council 12 and 13 
December 1997 Presidency Conclusions. Brussels, Belgium. 
Council of the European Union. 1999. Helsinki European Council 10 and 11 December 
1999 Presidency Conclusions. Brussels, Belgium. 
Council of the European Union. 2002. Brussels European Council 24 and 25 October 
2002 Presidency Conclusions. Brussels, Belgium. 
Council of the European Union. 2003. Copenhagen European Council 12 and 13 
December 2002 Presidency Conclusions. Brussels, Belgium. 
Council of the European Union. 2004. Brussels European Council 25 and 26 March 
2004 Presidency Conclusions. Brussels, Belgium. 
Council of the European Union. 2005. Brussels European Council 16 and 17 December 
2004 Presidency Conclusions. Brussels, Belgium. 
Council of the European Union. 2006. 2770th Council Meeting General Affairs and 
External Relations Press Release. Brussels, Belgium. 
Council of the European Union. 2008. Council Decision of 13 February 2008 on the 
Principles, Priorities, and Conditions Contained in the Accession Partnership with 
Turkey and Repealing Decision 2006/35/EC. Brussels, Belgium. 
76 
 
Council of the European Union. 2010. Brussels European Council 16 and 17 December 
2010 Presidency Conclusions. Brussels, Belgium. 
Cowles, Maria Green, James Caporaso, and Thomas Risse. 2001. Transforming Europe: 
Europeanization and Domestic Change. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Crisp, Jeff. 2016. “Protection and Pragmatism: the EU-Turkey Refugee Deal in 
Historical Perspective.” openDemocracy. 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/jeff-crisp/protection-and-
pragmatism-eu-turkey-refugee-deal-in-historical-perspecti (May 11, 2018). 
Çarkoğlu, Ali, and Çiğdem Kentmen. 2011. “Diagnosing Trends and Determinants in 
Public Support for Turkeys EU Membership.” South European Society and 
Politics16(3): 365–79. 
Dimitrova, Antoaneta L. 2011. “Speeding up or Slowing down? Lessons from the Last 
Enlargement on the Dynamics of Enlargement-Driven Reform.” South European 
Society and Politics 16(2): 221–33. 
Dombey, Daniel, James Fontanella-Khan, and Quentin Peel. 2013. “Germany Blocks 
Turkey’s Bid to Join EU.” Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/2432cc2c-
d9c0-11e2-bab1-00144feab7de (May 11, 2018). 
Elbasani, Arolda. 2014. European Integration and Transformation in the Western 
Balkans: Europeanization or Business as Usual? London, the UK: Routledge. 
Erdemli, Özgül. 2003. “Chronology: Turkey’s Relations with the EU” In Turkey and the 
European Union: Domestic Poliitcs, Economic Integration, and International 
Dynamics, eds. Ali Çarkoğlu and Barry M. Rubin. London, the UK: Frank Cass. 
European Commission. 1989. Commission Opinion on Turkey's Request for Accession 
to the Community. Brussels, Belgium. 
European Commission. 2002. 2002 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards 
Accession. Brussels, Belgium. 
European Commission. 2003. 2003 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards 
Accession. Brussels, Belgium. 
European Commission. 2004a. 2004 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards 
Accession. Brussels, Belgium. 
European Commission. 2004b. Commission of Staff Working Paper: Issues Arising 
From Turkey’s Membership Perspective. Brussels, Belgium. 
77 
 
European Commission. 2004c. Communication from the Commission to the Council 
and the European Parliament: Recommendation of the European Commission on 
Turkey’s Progress towards Accession. Brussels, Belgium. 
European Commission. 2006. 2006 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards 
Accession. Brussels, Belgium. 
European Commission. 2008. 2008 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards 
Accession. Brussels, Belgium 
European Commission. 2009a. 2009 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards 
Accession. Brussels, Belgium 
European Commission. 2009b. Enlargement Strategy Paper. Brussels, Belgium 
European Commission. 2010. Enlargement Strategy Paper. Brussels, Belgium 
European Commission. 2013a. EU-Turkey: Putting Accession Talks Back on the Track, 
New Chapter Opened. Brussels, Belgium. 
European Commission. 2013b. Turkey 2013 Progress Report. Brussels, Belgium. 
European Commission. 2014. Turkey 2014 Progress Report. Brussels, Belgium. 
European Commission. 2015. Turkey 2015 Progress Report. Brussels, Belgium. 
European Commission. 2016. “Acquis.” European Neighborhood Policy and 
Enlargement Negotiations. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-
enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/acquis_en (June 02, 2018). 
European Parliament. 2013. Resolution on the Situation in Turkey. 2013/2664 (RSP). 
Brussels, Belgium. 
Falkner, Gerda, Oliver Treib, Miriam Hartlapp, and Simone Leiber. 2005. Complying 
with Europe: EU Harmonisation and Soft Law in the Member States. Cambridge, the 
UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Grabbe, Heather. 2006. The EU's Transformative Power: Europeanization through 
Conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan 
Gürsoy, Yaprak. 2011. “The Impact of EU-Driven Reforms on the Political Autonomy 
of the Turkish Military.” South European Society and Politics16(2): 293–308. 
Héritier Adrienne et al. 2001. Differential Europe: the European Union Impact on 
National Policymaking. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. 
78 
 
Hix, Simon, and Klaus H. Goetz. 2000. “Introduction: European Integration and 
National Political Systems.” West European Politics 23(4): 1–26. 
Hürriyet Daily News. 2013. “Timeline of Gezi Park Protests.” Hürriyet Daily News. 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/timeline-of-gezi-park-protests--48321 (May 30, 
2018). 
Hürriyet Daily News. 2015. “Explained: Turkey’s Controversial Security Bill.” 
Hürriyet Daily News. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/explained-turkeys-
controversial-security-bill-78658 (May 25, 2018). 
Ilie, Cornelia. 2010. “Analytical Perspectives on Parliamentary and Extra-Parliamentary 
Discourses.” Journal of Pragmatics 42(4): 879–84. 
Kalaycıoğlu, Ersin. 2011. “The Turkish–EU Odyssey and Political Regime Change in 
Turkey.” South European Society and Politics 16(2): 265–78. 
Kaliber, Alper. 2014. “Europeanization in Turkey: In Search of a New Paradigm of 
Modernization.” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 16(1): 30–46. 
Keyman, E. Fuat, and Şebnem Gümüşçü. 2014. Democracy, Identity and Foreign 
Policy in Turkey: Hegemony through Transformation. London, the UK: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Kirişçi, Kemal. 2014. “Will the Readmission Agreement Bring the EU and Tukey 
Together or Pull Them Apart?” CEPS Commentary. Center for European Policy 
Studies, Brussels, Belgium. 
Kubicek, Paul. 2011. “Political Conditionality and European Union’s Cultivation of 
Democracy in Turkey.” Democratization 18(4): 910–31. 
Ladrech, Robert. 1994. “Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The 
Case of France.” Journal of Common Market Studies 32(1): 69-88. 
Lave, Charles A., and James G. March. 1993. An Introduction to Models in the Social 
Sciences. Lanham, MD: University Press of America. 
Legro, Jeffrey W., and Andrew Moravcsik. 1999. “Is Anybody Still a 
Realist?” International Security 24(2): 5–55. 
Manners, Ian. 2002. “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?” Journal of 
Common Market Studies 40(2): 235–58. 
Manners, Ian. 2006. “Normative Power Europe Reconsidered: Beyond the Crossroads.” 
Journal of European Public Policy 13(2): 182–99. 
79 
 
McLaren, Lauren M., and Meltem Müftüler-Baç. 2003. “Turkish Parliamentarians 
Perspectives on Turkeys Relations with the European Union.” Turkish Studies 4(1): 
195–218. 
Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York, NY: 
W.W. Norton & Company. 
Moravcsik, Andrew. 1992. “Liberalism and International Relations Theory.” Paper No. 
92-6, Center for International Affairs at Harvard University, Cambridge, MA. 
Moravcsik, Andrew. 1997. “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of 
International Politics.” International Organization 51(04): 513–53. 
Moravcsik, Andrew. 1998. The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power 
from Messina to Maastricht. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Moravcsik, Andrew, and Milada Anna Vachudova. 2003. “National Interests, State 
Power, and EU Enlargement.” East European Politics and Societies 17(1): 42–57.  
Müftüler-Baç Meltem. 1997. Turkey’s Relations with a Changing Europe. Manchester, 
the UK: Manchester University Press. 
Müftüler-Baç, Meltem. 2003. “Turkish Political Science and European 
Integration.” Journal of European Public Policy 10(4): 655–63. 
Müftüler-Baç, Meltem. 2005. “Turkeys Political Reforms and the Impact of the 
European Union.” South European Society and Politics 10(1): 17–31. 
Müftüler-Baç, Meltem. 2016. “Judicial Reform in Turkey and the EU’s Political 
Conditionality: (Mis)Fit between Domestic Preferences and EU Demands.” MAXCAP 
Working Paper No. 18, Maximizing the Integration Capacity of the European Union: 
Lessons of and Prospects for Enlargement and Beyond, Berlin, Germany. 
Müftüler-Baç, Meltem, and Rahime Süleymanoğlu-Kürüm. 2015. “Deliberations in the 
Turkish Parliament: The External Perceptions of European Foreign Policy.” Journal of 
Language and Politics 14(2): 258–84. 
Müftüler‐Baç, Meltem, and Yaprak Gürsoy. 2010. “Is There a Europeanization of 
Turkish Foreign Policy? An Addendum to the Literature on EU Candidates.” Turkish 
Studies 11(3): 405–27. 
Nas Çiğdem, and Özer Yonca, eds. 2012. Turkey and the European Union: Processes of 
Europeanisation. Farnham, the UK: Ashgate 
Noutcheva, Gergana, and Senem Aydın-Düzgit. 2012. “Lost in Europeanisation: The 
Western Balkans and Turkey.” West European Politics 35(1): 59–78. 
80 
 
Olsen, Johan P. 2002. “Many Faces of Europeanization.” Journal of Common Market 
Studies 40(5): 921-52. 
Oran, Baskın. 2010a. “1945-1960: Turkey is in the Orbit of the Western Bloc - I” In 
Turkish Foreign Policy: 1919-2006, ed. Baskın Oran. Salt Lake City, UT: University of 
Utah Press, 283-390. 
Oran, Baskın. 2010b. “1960-1980: Relative Autonomy” In Turkish Foreign Policy: 
1919-2006, ed. Baskın Oran. Salt Lake City, UT: University of Utah Press, 391-519. 
Öniş, Ziya. 2003. “Domestic Politics, International Norms and Challenges to the State: 
Turkey-EU Relations in the Post-Helsinki Era.” Turkish Studies 4(1): 9–34. 
Öniş, Ziya. 2007. “Conservative Globalists versus Defensive Nationalists: Political 
Parties and Paradoxes of Europeanization in Turkey.” Journal of Southern Europe and 
the Balkans 9(3): 247–61. 
Öniş, Ziya. 2010. “Contesting for Turkeys Political ‘Centre’: Domestic Politics, Identity 
Conflicts and the Controversy over EU Membership.” Journal of Contemporary 
European Studies 18(3): 361–76. 
Özbudun, Ergun. 2014. “AKP at the Crossroads: Erdoğan’s Majoritarian Drift.” South 
European Society and Politics 19(2): 155–67. 
Özbudun, Ergun. 2015. “Turkey’s Judiciary and the Drift Toward Competitive 
Authoritarianism.” The International Spectator50(2): 42–55. 
Parslow, Joakim. 2006. “Turkish Political Parties and the European Union: How 
Turkish MPs Frame the Issue of Adapting to EU Conditionality.” MA Thesis. 
University of Oslo. 
Patton, Marcie J. 2007. “AKP Reform Fatigue in Turkey: What Has Happened to the 
EU Process?” Mediterranean Politics 12(3): 339–58. 
Putnam, Robert D. 1988. “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level 
Games.” International Organization 42(3): 427-60. 
Radaelli, Claudio. 2003. “The Europeanization of Public Policy” In The Politics of 
Europeanization, eds. Kevin Featherstone and Claudio Radaelli. New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press, 27-56. 
Radaelli, Claudio, and Romain Pasquier. 2006. “Encounters with Europe: Concepts, 
Definitions, and Research Design.” Politik 3(9): 6-15. 
81 
 
Rankin, Jennifer. 2017. “Council of Europe Vote Puts Pressure on Turkey over Human 
Rights.” Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/26/council-of-europe-
turkey-human-rights-pace (May 11, 2018). 
Saatçioğlu, Beken. 2010. “Unpacking the Compliance Puzzle: The Case of Turkey’s 
AKP under EU Conditionality.” KFG Working Paper No: 14, Kolleg-Forschergruppe: 
The Transformative Power of Europe, Berlin, Germany. 
Saatçioğlu, Beken, 2015. “Turkey’s EU Membership Process in the Aftermath of Gezi 
Protests.” In Everywhere Taksim: Sowing the Seeds for a New Turkey at Gezi, eds. 
Isabel David and Kumru Toktamış. Amsterdam, the Netherlands: Amsterdam 
University Press, 267-81. 
Saatçioğlu, Beken. 2016. “De-Europeanisation in Turkey: The Case of the Rule of 
Law.” South European Society and Politics 21(1): 133–46. 
Schimmelfennig, Frank, and Ulrich Sedelmeier. 2004. “Governance by Conditionality: 
EU Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe.” Journal 
of European Public Policy 11(4): 661–79. 
Schimmelfennig, Frank, and Ulrich Sedelmeier, eds. 2005. The Europeanization of 
Central and Eastern Europe. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Schweller, Randall L. 2003. “The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism.” In 
Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field, eds. C. Elman and M. 
F. Elman. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Tanıyıcı, Şaban. 2010. “Europeanization of Political Elite Discourses in Turkey: A 
Content Analysis of Parliamentary Debates 1994–2002.” Turkish Studies 11(2): 181–95. 
TBMM. 2013a. Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi: 120. Birleşim, 13 
Haziran 2013 Perşembe. June 13. Ankara, Turkey. 
TBMM. 2013b. Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi: 124. Birleşim, 25 
Haziran 2013 Salı. June 25. Ankara, Turkey. 
TBMM. 2013c. Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi: 129. Birleşim, 3 
Temmuz 2013 Çarşamba. July 3. Ankara, Turkey. 
TBMM. 2013d. Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi: 132. Birleşim, 6 
Temmuz 2013 Cumartesi. July 6. Ankara, Turkey. 
TBMM. 2013e. Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi: 133. Birleşim, 7 
Temmuz 2013 Pazar. July 7. Ankara, Turkey. 
82 
 
TBMM. 2013f. Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi: 30. Birleşim, 13 Aralık 
2013 Cuma. December 13. Ankara, Turkey. 
TBMM. 2014a. Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi: 49. Birleşim, 21 Ocak 
2014 Salı. January 21. Ankara, Turkey. 
TBMM. 2014b. Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi: 50. Birleşim, 22 Ocak 
2014 Çarşamba. January 22. Ankara, Turkey. 
TBMM. 2014c. Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi: 57. Birleşim, 5 Şubat 
2014 Çarşamba. February 5. Ankara, Turkey. 
TBMM. 2014d. Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi: 79. Birleşim, 22 Nisan 
2014 Salı. April 22. Ankara, Turkey. 
TBMM. 2014e. Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi: 106. Birleşim, 19 
Haziran 2014 Perşembe. June 19. Ankara, Turkey. 
TBMM. 2014f. Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi: 107. Birleşim, 24 
Haziran 2014 Salı. June 24. Ankara, Turkey. 
TBMM. 2014g. Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi: 117. Birleşim, 16 
Temmuz 2014 Çarşamba. July 16. Ankara, Turkey. 
TBMM. 2014h. Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi: 8. Birleşim, 23 Ekim 
2014 Perşembe. October 23. Ankara, Turkey. 
TBMM. 2014i. Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi: 17. Birleşim, 20 Kasım 
2014 Perşembe. November 20. Ankara, Turkey. 
TBMM. 2014j. Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi: 28. Birleşim, 13 Aralık 
2014 Cumartesi. December 13. Ankara, Turkey. 
TBMM. 2014k. Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi: 34. Birleşim, 19 Aralık 
2014 Cuma. December 19. Ankara, Turkey. 
TBMM. 2015a. Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi: 38. Birleşim, 6 Ocak 
2015 Salı. January 6. Ankara, Turkey. 
TBMM. 2015b. Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi: 42. Birleşim, 14 Ocak 
2015 Çarşamba. January 14. Ankara, Turkey. 
Thatcher, Mark. 2004. “Winners and Losers in Europeanisation: Reforming the 
National Regulation of Telecommunications.” West European Politics 27(2): 284–309. 
83 
 
Tocci, Nathalie. 2005. “Europeanization in Turkey: Trigger or Anchor for 
Reform?” South European Society and Politics 10(1): 73–83. 
Tocci, Nathalie. 2010. “Unblocking Turkey’s EU Accession.” Insight Turkey 12(3): 27-
31. 
Toksabay, Ece, and Tülay Karadeniz. 2017. “EU Parliament Calls for Turkey Accession 
Talks to Be Suspended.” Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-eu-
parliament/eu-parliament-calls-for-turkey-accession-talks-to-be-suspended-
idUSKBN19R194 (May 11, 2018). 
Turkey. Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi, 24th ser., vol. 106. 
Uğur, Mehmet. 1999. The European Union and Turkey: An Anchor/Credibility 
Dilemma. Aldershot, the UK: Ashgate. 
Van Dijk, Teun A. 2003. “Knowledge in Parliamentary Debates.” Journal of Language 
and Politics Parliamentary Discourse 2(1): 93–129. 
Waltz, Kenneth Neal. 1979. Theory of International Politics. Reading, MA: Addison-
Wesley. 
Yılmaz, Gözde. 2012. “From EU Conditionality to Domestic Choice for Change: 
Exploring Europeanization of Minority Rights in Turkey.” In Turkey and the European 
Union: Processes of Europeanization, eds. Çiğdem Nas and Yonca Özer. Farnham, the 
UK: Ashgate, 119-40. 
Yılmaz, Gözde, and Diğdem Soyaltın. 2014. “Zooming into the ‘Domestic’ in 
Europeanization: Promotion of Fight against Corruption and Minority Rights in 
Turkey.” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies16(1): 11–29.  
YSK. 2011. 22 Haziran 2011 ve 1070 Sayılı YSK Kararı. 1070. Ankara, Turkey. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
84 
 
 
APPENDIX 
 
Figure 1a. Frequency of the positive and negative references to Europe from June 
2013 to June 2015 
 
Figure 1b. Frequency of the positive and negative references to the EU from June 2013 
to June 2015 
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Figure 2a. Pareto chart describing the distribution of the categories in the discussion 
of Europe from June 2013 to June 2015
 
 
Figure 2b. Pareto chart describing the distribution of the categories in the discussion 
of the EU from June 2013 to June 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
86 
 
Figure 3a. Frequency of democratization discussions in relation to Europe, from 
June 2013 to June 2015 
 
 
Figure 3b. Frequency of democratization discussions in relation to the EU, from 
June 2013 to June 2015 
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Figure 4a. Frequency of foreign policy discussions in relation to Europe, from June 
2013 to June 2015 
 
 
Figure 4b. Frequency of foreign policy discussions in relation to the EU, from June 
2013 to June 2015 
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Figure 5a. Frequency of policy adaptation discussions in relation to Europe, from 
June 2013 to June 2015 
 
 
Figure 5b. Frequency of policy adaptation discussions in relation to the EU, from June 
2013 to June 2015 
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Figure 6a. Frequency of accession discussions in relation to Europe, from June 2013 
to June 2015 
 
 
Figure 6b. Frequency of accession discussions in relation to the EU, from June 2013 
to June 2015 
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Figure 7a. Frequency of economy discussions in relation to Europe, from June 2013 
to June 2015 
 
Figure 7b. Frequency of economy discussions in relation to the EU, from June 2013 
to June 2015 
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Figure 8a. Frequency of discussions on politics in Europe, from June 2013 to June 
2015 
 
Figure 8b. Frequency of discussions on politics in the EU, from June 2013 to June 
2015 
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